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A PERMANENT BANKRUPTCY CHAPTER FOR FARMERS: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
SECTION 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, popularly known as the Frazier-Lemke
Act, lapsed for the third time on March 31, 1947.1 Pending in Congress at
1. Section 75 (a) to (r) dealing with farmer-debtor compositions and extensions
was enacted in 1933. 47 STAT. 1470 (1933). The demand for further legislation to put
teeth into Section 75 produced the Frazier-Lemke amendment (subsection (s)] which
established a farm mortgage moratorium procedure. 48 STAT. 1289 (1934). The original
subsection (s) was declared unconstitutional in 1935 [Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555] and a new subsection (s) enacted the same year, 49 STAT. 943
(1935). This was upheld by a unanimous court in Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440
(1937).
By its original terms, Section 75 was to be effective only until March 3, 1938.
But by Act of March 4, 1938, its life was extended two additional years to March 4,
1940. 52 STAT. 84 (1938). The Act of March 4, 1940 again re-extended its effectiveness
for four years until March 4, 1944. 54 STAT. 40 (1940). In 1944 the first hiatus oc-
curred when there was a seven-day lapse to March 11, 1944 before the Section was re-
extended until March 4, 1946. 58 STAT. 113 (1944). A second hiatus of three months
occurred in 1946. On June 3, 1946 Section 75 was again re-extended until March 31,
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the time were two bills, 2 each of which proposed to rewrite the major provi-
sions of Section 75 in new and permanent form as Chapter XVI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The eminent desirability of a permanent chapter for farmers as a
part of the Bankruptcy Act,3 and the probability of action in an early session
of Congress on one or the other of the pending bills, suggest a comparative
1947. Pub. L. No. 395, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 3, 1946), 11 U.S.C.A. § 203 (c) (Supp.
1946).
In addition to these extensions, Section 75 has been amended a number of times.
For a rsumE of these legislative changes, see 5 COLLmm, BA.,;xnurc" f 75.02 (14th ed.
1943).
Subsections of Section 75 will hereinafter be referred to by subsection letter only.
All references will be to Section 75 with all Amendments to July 1, 1946. 11 U.S.C.
§203 (1940), as amended 11 U.S.C. §203 (Supp. 1945), 11 U.S.C.A. §203 (Supp. 1946).
2. The first of these bills is the McCarran-Lemke bill, introduced in the House on
January 6, 1947, H.R. 463, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and in the Senate on January
27, 1947, S. 422, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The other bill was prepared by the
National Bankruptcy Conference and introduced in the House by Congressman Reed
on March 10, 1947, H.R. 2451, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Both bills were referred
to the House Committee on the Judiciary and at this writing were awaiting hearings at
an undetermined date.
This is not the first time that legislation has been proposed to make the farm bank-
ruptcy provisions a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Act. In 1939, a Frazier-Lemrke
bill was introduced which proposed to rewrite and make permanent the major pro-
visions of Section 75. S. 1935, H.R. 7528, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). Hearings were
held in 1940 but no action was taken other than to extend § 75 an additional four years.
In 1940, a proposal was made by the National Bankruptcy Conference to revise § 75
into a new and permanent chapter of the Bankruptcy Act. A completely redrafted statute
was presented for the consideration of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the House
Committee on the Judiciary but failed of adoption. 5 ComLmR, BAN namtCY 129 n.S
(14th ed. 1943); Oglebay, Sone Developments it Bankruptcy Law, 18 J.N.A. REP.
BAxa. 68, 70, n. 24 (1944).
3. The need for permanent bankruptcy provisions for the benefit of farmers seems
dear. An historic objective of American agricultural policy has been the encouragement
of the owner-operated farm and the elimination of absentee farm ownership and farm
tenancy. See A. NV. GRIswoLD, AGRAMANISX AND DsmocnAcy (author's manuscript;
scheduled for publication in 1947 by Harcourt, Brace & Co.). Preventive measures for
effectuating these policy objectives have been government-financed agencies offering the
farmer credit on terms more liberal than private institutions could afford and risk-
ing capital in agricultural investment fields where private institutions did not dare to
venture. See Comment, Proposed Retisions in the Farm Credit Systcn: Current Legis-
lation, 51 YA.E L.J. 649 (1942); Gusworm, op. cit. suipra. But when the farmer's
economic position has reached the stage where preventive measures are ineffective, reme-
dial measures become necessary. Such a remedial measure was the Frazier-Lemke Act,
aptly termed by one commentator "bankruptcy reorganization for farmers." See
Letzler, Bankruptcy Reorgaizations for Farmers, 40 CoL. L. Rv. 1133 (1940). De-
signed to give the farmer an opportunity to scale down his secured debts and to shift the
loss of cyclical land value fluctuations to the shoulders of the creditor, it sought to
achieve the desirable objective of keeping the farmer the owner of his farm.
Although the Frazier-Lemke Act was concededly designed to protect the farmer in
a situation where the creditor ordinarily is dominant and although the rights of creditors
were only an incidental consideration, the forebodings of its opponents that it would
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analysis of the major features of these two bills in the light of the problems
encountered under Section 75.
In broad outline, Section 75 provided two procedures for maintaining the
debt-ridden farmer's ownership of his farm.4 Any farmer who was insolvent
or unable to meet his debts as they matured, could file a petition under subsec-
tions 75(a) to (r) stating that he desired to effect a composition or an exten-
sion of time to pay his debts. While the farmer and his creditors were at-
tempting to reach a composition or extension agreement, all proceedings
against the farmer and his property were stayed. If the negotiations failed or
if the fainer felt "aggrieved" by the agreement reached, he could amend his
petition, ask to be adjudged a bankrupt, and avail himself of subsection (s).
Under this subsection, he was continued in possession and all proceedings
against him were stayed for three years, during which the farmer had only to
pay a reasonable rental. If within the three year period the farmer paid the
appraisal value of his property into court, the property was thereby cleared of
all encuibrances and his title became absolute. If, however, he failed to pay
close the farmer off from the credit sources of private institutional investors has proved
unfounded. Although the proportion of farm mortgages held by private lenders was
markedly reduced between 1930 and 1938, the ratio has progressively increased since
1938 until in 1945 close to 66 percent of the total farm mortgage debt was held by pri-
vate lenders. LARSEN, DIsTmIuTON By LENDm GROUPS OF FARM-MORTGAGE AND REAL
ESTATE HOLDINGS, JANUARY 1, 1930-45 6-8 (U.S. Dep't Agric. 1945). This would seem
to indicate that Section 75 has not deterred private credit extension in the farm mortgage
field.
The argument that lack of use of Section 75, see Comment, 51 YALE L. J. 649, 659
(1942), indicates there is no necessity for permanent farm bankruptcy provisions, like-
wise seems without merit. Although as agriculture has ridden along on the recent boom
Section 75 has seen progressively decreasing use, nevertheless in the fiscal year 1945 it
was used more than any other of the relief sections or chapters of the Bankruptcy Act
except Chapter XIII. H.R. REP. No. 1588, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946). Moreover, the
immeasurable persuasive effect of Section 75 in encouraging out-of-court debt-scaling
agreements cannot be ignored. See SEN. REP. No. 985, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935) ;
Hearings before House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 6452 and S. 2215, 75th Cong.,
2d and 3d Sess. 55, 152, 168-9, 179 (1937-8) ; Hearings before House Comnmittec on
Judiciary on H.R. 7528 amd S. 1935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 25, 34 (1940) ; Hearings be.
fore House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 7356, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1942).
But for unfavorable comments on the Frazier-Lemke Act by those who take a dim
view of permanent farm bankruptcy legislation, see Hanna, New Frazier-Lemke Act,
1 Mo. L. Rxv. 1, 16-18 (1936); Perry, Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. Why Has the
Congress Extended it?, 20 CALIF. S.B.J. 163 (1945) ; Weinstein, Shall Section 75 Be
Made Pernwmnentf, 43 Comt. L. J. 99 (1938) ; testimony of Peyton R. Evans, General
Counsel, Farm Credit Administration, in Hearings before House Committec on Judiciary
on H.R. 6452 and S. 2215, 75th Cong., 2d and 3d Sess. 75, 79-112 (1937-8).
4. The best detailed treatment of Section 75 will be found in 5 COLLIa, BANX-
RupTCY 101-234 (14th ed. 1943). For briefer, but dated, discussions of Section 75, see
Diamond and Letzler, The New Frazier-Lemke Act: A Study, 37 CoL, L. REV. 1092
(1937) ; Hanna, Agriculture and the Bankruptcy Act, 19 MINN. L. Rnv. 1 (1934);
Hanna, New Frazier-Lemke Act, 1 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1936) ; Letzler, supra note 3; Comment,
48 Y E L. J. 859 (1939).
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this sum into court by the end of the three years, the property was sold at
judicial sale and he was granted a discharge.
Enacted in haste, Section 75 was scarcely a model of sound legislative
drafting.5 It was loosely worded and abounded with ambiguities, repetitions,
and omissions,6 while poor arrangement made it inconvenient to use. Al-
though subsection 75(s) was considerably revised, subsections 75(a)-(r)
remained substantially as enacted in 1933. Since the drafters of subsection
75(s) were attempting to meet specific constitutional standards established by
the 1935 Supreme Court, they could not fully utilize the broad legislative
power in this field which the subsequent shift in judicial attitude has shown
to be available.7 With varying degrees of success, the McCarran-Lemke bill8
(hereinafter referred to as the Lemke bill) and the National Bankruptcy
Conference bill2 (hereinafter referred to as the N.B.C. bill) attempt to elimi-
nate these defects. The N.B.C. bill, unlike the Lemke bill, codifies much of
the judicial effort that has gone into clarifying the verbal vagaries of Section
75,10 and largely eliminates the remaining ambiguities and omissions by more
precise and comprehensive wording. Either bill would be more convenient to
use than the former statute, since both bills are divided into Articles following
the structural form employed in Chapters X through XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act. However, this functional structure, successfully achieved in the N.B.C.
bill, is more apparent than real in the Lemke bill. And both bills embody a
fuller exercise of the constitutional power in this field than did Section 75.
The analysis which follows will treat the two bills concurrently article by
article, pointing out the problems involved under Section 75 and the changes
and clarifications effected by these bills in each instance.
CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
The precise relation which the general provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,
Chapters I through VII, bore to Section 75 was in many instances far from
clear." The first article of each bill attempts to clarify this ambiguity by
5. See 5 Coizrzn, BANxxurrcv 128 n. 18 (14th ed. 1943).
6. See Diamond and Letzler, The N ew Fra.ier-Le:.e Act: A Study, 37 Cor. L. RLT.
1092, 1133 (1937).
7. In 1939 it was said that one of the causes of the harsh reception then being given
Section 75 by many courts was the draftsmen's "obviously excessive care to avoid the pit-
falls of unconstitutionality." Comment, 48 YAXm L. J. 859, 872 (1939). The increasingly
liberal trend in judicial attitude in interpreting § 75 is discussed in footnote 134 infra.
8. S. 422, H.1. 463, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
9. H.. 2451, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
10. See Letzler, mspra note 3, at 1163.
11. For e.-ample, did the provisions of Chapters I to VII apply so as to authorize ap-
pointment of a trustee? Infra p. 1000. In regard to the provability of future rent claims?
Infra p. 1003. So as to authorize the avoidance of preferential and fraudulent transfers?
Infra p. 1000. The indicated provisions of the general bankruptcy chapters were said to be
inapplicable in the following cases: Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S.
447 (1943) (§ 8, by implication); In re Fell, 46 F. Supp. 103 (E. D. Wash. 1942)
1947]
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stating that, where not inconsistent, the provisions of Chapters I through VII
are applicable to farm bankruptcy proceedings.' 2
Following the structure of Chapters X through XIII, the second article of
each bill deals with definitions.' 3 Since the definition of "farmer" determines
who may file under the Chapter-a matter of much litigation under Section
75-this definition is probably the most important in Article II.', While Sec-
tion 75 was in effect, who was a farmer under the Bankruptcy Act depended
(§ 14(c)); In re Kovacevich, 31 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (§ 59(g)). But in the
cases which follow the stated provisions of Chapters I-VII were said to apply in § 75
proceedings: Federal Land Bank v. Morrison, 133 F. 2d 613 (C.C.A. 6th 1943) (provi-
sions of Chapters I-VII authorizing appointment of receiver) ; Armold v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. 83 F. 2d 530 (C.C.A. 7th 1936) (same) ; Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116
F. 2d 1004 (C.C.A. 10th 1941) (discharge provisions of Chapters I-VII) ; I re Wade, 54
F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1943) (provisions of Chapters I-VII authorizing appointment
of trustee) ; In re Casaudoumecq, 46 F. Supp. 718, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (provisions of
Chapters I-VII authorizing appointment of receiver). And see General Order § 50 (11)
making the general orders in bankruptcy, -where consistent, applicable under § 75.
12. Article I of the N.B.C. bill is identical with Article I of Chapter XI. Article I
of the Lemke bill is identical with the first article of Chapter XI, save that it omits the
last sentence included in § 302.
13. The definitions included in Article II of the N.B.C. bill are the following: (1)
"Claims"-substantially similar to § 406 (2). (2) "Creditor"--identical with §§ 106 (4),
606 (2). (3) "Debtor"-"Shall mean a farmer who files a petition under this Chapter."
(4) "Debts"-identical with §§ 106 (6), 406 (7), 606 (4). (5) "Executory Contracts"-
substantially similar to §§ 106 (7), 306 (4), 406 (4). (6) "Farmer"--see infra note 14.
(7) "Petition"-"a petition filed in a court of bankruptcy or with its clerk by a debtor
praying for the benefits of this chapter." (8) "Period of Redemption"--substantially
similar to § 75 (n). (9) "Plan"--identical with § 606 (7). (10) "Property of a Debtor"
-defined substantially as in § 75 (n). The definitions included in Article II of the Lemke
bill are the following: (1) "Period of Redemption"--identical with definition in § 75 (n).
(2) "Farmer-debtor"-"a farmer who could become a bankrupt under section 4 of this
Act and who files a petition under this 'chapter." (3) "Farmer"--see infra note 14. (4)
"Petition--"a petition filed under this chapter by a farmer."
14. The N.B.C. bill defines "farmer" as follows:
".... 'farmer' shall mean an individual primarily bona fide engaged in producing
products of the soil, or in dairy farming, or in the production of poultry or live-
stock, or in the production of poultry or livestock products in their unmanufac-
tured state, and the principal part of whose gross income is derived from any one
or more of such operations, whether so engaged personally or as a tenant or by
tenants, and shall include the executor, administrator, or personal representative
of the estate of any such deceased person so engaged at the time of his death in
one or more of the foregoing operations. The provisions of this chapter shall be
held to apply also to partnerships, to common, entirety, joint, or community
ownerships, or to farming corporations where at least 75 per centum of the stock
is owned by actual farmers; . . ."
The Lemke bill's definition of "farmer" is:
"'farmer' shall mean-
"(a) any individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in pro-
ducing any kind or kinds of commercial products of the soil;
"(b) any individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy
[Vol. 55:982
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on whether one applied the definition in Section 1(17) or that in Section
75(r).'-' This conflict of definitions raised two problems. The enactment of
Section 1(17) as part of the Chandler Act of 1938 posed the question whether
the definition in Section 1(17) had by implication repealed the definition in
Section 75 (r) .16 When Section 75 (r) was subsequently amended in 1940, the
further question arose whether this had impliedly repealed Section 1(17).' T
Even with this conflict resolved by limiting the scope of each section, the fact
remained that there was one definition for the "farmer" who could not be
adjudged an involuntary bankrupt and another definition for the "farmer"
who might proceed voluntarily under the farm bankruptcy provisions. Al-
though policy reasons have been suggested for the two variant definitions,18
such reasons lack persuasiveness and appear to be no more than ex post facto
farming, the production of poultry or livestock, or the production of poultry or
livestock products in their unmanufactured state;
"(c) any individual the principal part of whose income is derived from any
one or more of the operations specified in clauses (a) and (b), whether such op-
erations are engaged in by the individual or by tenants;
"(d) the executor, administrator, or personal representative of a deceased
individual specified in clauses (a), (b), or (c) ;
"(e) any partnership or any common, entirety, joint, or community owyner-
ship composed of individuals specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), or (d) ; or
"(f) any farming corporation in which at least 75 per centum of the stock is
owned by individuals specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), or (d) ; . . ."
15. Under the definition in § 75 (r) the two tests of occupation and income are sepa-
rated by the disjunctive "or," thus making the two tests apparently alternative. But under
the definition in § 1 (17) the two tests are separated by "if," thus making them concurrent
conditions to qualifying as a farmer. In this, and other respects, the definition in § 1 (17)
is generally more restrictive than that in § 75 (r). The two definitions are compared in 1
CoLUpR, BArKRUP=Cv ff4.15 (14th ed. 1940).
16. When the definition of farmer in § 1 (17) mas enacted as part of the Chandler
Act in 1938, the argument was subsequently made, contrary to what seemed the intent of
the draftsmen, that § 1 (17) had by implication repealed § 75 (r) and that the individuals
who could petition under § 75 were thus determined by reference to § 1 (17). In Benitez
v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 313 U.S. 270 (1941), the Supreme Court refuted this argument
and held that for the purposes of proceedings under § 75 the status of "farmer" is deter-
mined by the definition in § 75 (r) and not by the definition in § 1 (17). See Note, 26
CoPN. L. Q. 308, 310-11 (1941) ; Note, 18 Omn. L. REv. 103, 109-10 (1939).
17. In 1940, § 75 (r) was amended by eliminating the reference to § 74. 54 STAT. 40
(1940). However, since the reference to § 4(b) was retained, this poses the question
whether this amendment repealed § 1 (17) by implication. For the contention that it did
repeal § 1 (17), see Note, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1091, 1092 (1941). For the argument that
it did not repeal § 1 (17), see 5 COLLINS, BAxrRUPrcy 146 n. 10 (14th ed. 1943) ; Note, 26
Copa. L. Q. 308, 311 (1941). The argument against repeal by implication seems the
sounder and more convincing.
18. The policy reason most frequently given is, to restrict exemptions from involun-
tary bankruptcy and to enlarge the class of debtors permitted rehabilitation. See Note, 26
Copx. L. Q. 308, 311 (1941) ; Note, 89 U. P.&. L. REv. 1091, 1092 (1941). A moment's
reflection will show, however, that these are not reasons but rather only statements of con-
clusions.
1947]
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rationalizations for what is in fact merely an historical legislative accident.10
Accordingly it would seem desirable that there be but one definition for the
entire Bankruptcy Act. The Lemke bill achieves this objective by amending
Section 1 (17) so that its definition corresponds, with that in the proposed
Chapter XVI.2 But the N.B.C. bill, which says nothing about Section 1 (17)
apparently contemplates continuation of two definitions.
Subsection 75 (r) defined a farmer as one "primarily bona fide personally
engaged ' 1 in specified farming operations "or" one "the principal part of
whose income is derived" from such operations. Since use of the disjunctive
"or" apparently established two alternative tests, considerable controversy
developed as to whether the absentee landlord who qualified under the second
test by deriving~the principal part of his income from farming was entitled to
avail himself of the provisions of Section 75.22 As the prime objective of
farm bankruptcy proceedings is to keep the farmer the owner of his farm,
which usually is his home as well as his place of work, sound policy would
seem to dictate that the absentee landlord should be excluded from the benefits
19. When the Chandler Act, of which § 1 (17) was a part, was passed in 1938, the
draftsmen did not concern themselves with § 75 since it was only temporary legislation
scheduled then to expire by itsvown limitation. See excerpt from Committee Print Analy-
sis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), quoted in Note, 18 OaR. L. REv. 108, 110
n. 13 (1939). But since § 75 did not expire but instead was reextended for nine additional
years, the conflict of definitions continued.
20. Lemke bill, § 2.
21. Despite the fact that the word "personally" would seem to indicate otherwise, it
was well settled under § 75 (r) that the debtor did not actually have to till the sol with
his own hands to be a farmer. Williams v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 124 F. 2d 38
(C.C.A. 5th 1941), cert. ,denied, 316 U.S. 663 (1942); 5 CoLLIm, BANKRUPTCY 149 (14th
ed. 1943). Accordingly, the N.B.C. bill omits the word "personally" and requires only
that the debtor be "primarily bona fide engaged" in farming.
22. In First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Beach, 86 F. 2d 88 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), the Sec-
ond Circuit held that while the debtor was not primarily personally engaged in farming, he
was nevertheless a farmer within the meaning of § 75 (r) because he derived the principal
part of his income from farming. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground
that the debtor was primarily personally engaged in farming, specifically reserving the
question whether the receipt of income derived from farming would make a farmer out of
some one primarily engaged in different activities. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Beach,
301 U.S. 435 (1937).
The question reserved by the Supreme Court in the Beach case was answered by the
Ninth Circuit in Shyvers v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 108 F. 2d 611 (C.C.A. 9th 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 668 (1940). There the debtor was owner of extensive farm lands in
California but had been resident in England for a number of years. The principal part of
her income was concededly drawn from these farm lands. It was held that she was not a
farmer within the meaning of §75 (r). The Shyvers case is said to have been "erroneously
decided" in Note, 30 CoRN. L. Q. 389, 391 (1945), and its reasoning "somewhat difficult
to follow" in 5 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 156 (14th ed. 1943) ; but it is approved as having
"adopted an interpretation which is consistent not only with the letter but also with the
spirit of the law," in Letzler, supra note 3, at 1140.
The growing weight of authority supports the view of the Shyvers case that an ab-
sentee landlord, whose only connection with the farm is that he derives the principal part
[Vol. 56: 982
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of such proceedings. But the Lemke bill appears to include within its defini-
tion of farmer the absentee landowner the principal part of whose income
stems merely from farm ownership.a On the other hand, the N.B.C. bill by
using the conjunctive "and" makes the two tests of 75 (r) cumulative instead
of alternative. The absentee landlord thus seems clearly excluded under the
N.B.C. bill definition. 4
The converse of the position of the absentee landowner is that of the man
who, while engaged in farming, does not derive the principal part of his in-
come therefrom.? Under 75(r), such an individual would have to qualify
under the first alternative test which required that he be "primarily, bona fide
personally engaged" in specified farming operations. As long as he satisfied
these requirements the source of his income was immaterial,2 so that the
farmer whose income in a bad year dropped below his outside income,-r if
any, or who normally received a greater income from non-farm sources
could still avail himself of Section 75. But under the N.B.C. bill definition,
since the would-be farmer must meet the tests of both occupation and income,
it would seem that an individual who derived a greater income from non-farm
sources would be excluded regardless of the fact that his primary occupation
was farming.
of his income therefrom, is not a farmer within the meaning of § 75 (r). Jordan v. Fed-
eral Farm Mortgage Corp., 152 F. 2d 642 (C.C.A. 8th 1945) ; 5 Cora.xnm, op. d. supra at
153-4; Letzler, supra at 1139; see Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 125 F. 2d 523, 529
(C.C.A. 1st 1942). Though such decisions concededly do violence to the language of the
statute, they clearly seem to be within its spirit, for the reasons mentioned in the text of
this Comment.
23. Were it not for the addition in clause (c) of the new phrase, "whether such op-
erations are engaged in by the individual or by tenants," it might be argued that the rea-
soning of the Shvvers case would still apply under this clause. However, the addition of
this phrase appears to vitiate the Shyvers case rationale, thus including the absentee land-
lord who does nothing but derive the principal part of his income from farming operatiom.
24. However, since the N.B.C. bill makes it clear that the specified operations may
be carried on "by tenants," it would seem that the individual who does not live on the
farm and who does not personally till the soil, but whose primary occupation is running
farms, would be included. The definition thus embraces some absentee landowners. An
absentee landowner such as the debtor in the Williams case would appear to be included.
Williams v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 124 F. 2d 38 (C.C.A. 5th 1941), ccrt. decied
316 U.S. 663 (1942). But an absentee landlord in the position of the debtor in the Shyvrs
case would be excluded.
Although it can be argued that no absentee landowners should be included, the N.B.C.
bill at least makes an attempt to exclude the more obvious type of absentee landlord.
25. For examples of individuals who derived the principal part of their income from
non-farm sources, see hI re Lindsay, 41 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Tex. 1941) ; In re Schermer-
horn, 41 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wash. 1941) ; In re Knight, 9 F. Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1934).
26. In re Lindsay, 41 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Tex. 1941); 5 Co.rsm, B -,-=urcy 156
(14th ed. 1943).
27. In re Schermerhorn, 41 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
28. In re Lindsay, 41 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Tex. 1941).
29. Other individuals excluded would be those in the situation of the debtor in In re
Schermerhorn, 41 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wash. 1941). With income from his farm reduced
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In the last analysis, the job of applying the definition must be left to the
courts, guided by the policy of the statute and the particular equities of each
case. It would thus seem desirable to have a definition which is as flexible as
possible.30 Alternative tests would seem to furnish more flexibility than
cumulative ones. Under 75 (r) the trend of judicial decision was toward ap-
plying the alternative tests so as to exclude the absentee landlord and to
include the individual who was primarily engaged in farming but did not
derive the principal part of his income therefrom. Though the Lemke bill uses
alternative tests, the addition of a new phrases' precludes the judicial trend
toward excluding the absentee landlord. By employing cumulative tests, the
N.B.C. bill prevents the farmer whose main income is derived from non-
farm sources from availing himself of the Chapter. It is suggested that both
definitions are in this respect deficient.
3 2
A third problem left largely unsolved by 75 (r) was whether the definition
included a tenant farmer. 33 Since a tenant farmer might have hypothecated
as security for loans his leasehold interest, his farming equipment, his crops,
to nil, the debtor was forced to seek employment first as a trucker, then with the W.PA.,
and finally as a miner. Although almost all of his income was derived from these jobs, the
court was able to find that, since he intended eventually to return to fanning, he had thus
not lost his status as one primarily bona fide personally engaged in farming. The nature
of his income was accordingly immaterial. But under the N.B.C. bill, even if the same
reasoning were employed to qualify him for the occupation test, he would still be unable to
meet the income test and would thus be excluded.
A similar situation arose in Leonard v. Bennett, 116 F. 2d 128 (C.C.A. 9th 1940),
where by the same rationale the court was able to find that the debtor was a "farmer."
But under the N.B.C. bill's definition such a debtor would be excluded.
Under § 75 (r), the more authoritative view was that in determining whether farm
income was the principal part of one's income, gross income was the figure to bq consid-
ered. 5 Coma, BANKRUPTCY 156 n. 38 (14th ed. 1943). The fairly obvious reasons for
using gross income are explained in In re Knight, 9 F. Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1934). The
N.B.C. bill specifically provides that gross income shall be considered in making the de-
termination. This would tend to include debtors whose predicament approached but was
not as serious as that of the individuals in the Schernierhorn and Leonard cases,
30. See Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L. J. 458 (1947). "Today,
judges do not even pretend to make a mechanical application of the words of statutes.
They much prefer to discover and apply the purposes of statutes." Id. at 468.
31. See supra note 23.
32. Another possible shortcoming of the two definitions is illustrated in the recent
case of Dunkly v. Erich, 158 F. 2d 1 (C.C.A. 9th 1946) where the court held that since
fish were not livestock therefore a "trout farmer" was not a farmer under § 75 (r). Be-
cause it had previously been generally held that individuals engaged in cattle and sheep
ranching, poultry raising, and dairy farming were not farmers, Congress amended § 75 (r)
in 1935 specifically to include those individuals. 5 CoLLimR, BANKRUPTCY 145-6 (14th ed.
1943). The Dunkly case's exclusion of "trout farmers" suggests that a similar broadening
amendment should be made in the two pending bills.
33. See McLean v. Federal Land Bank, 130 F. 2d 123, 127 (C.C.A. 8th 1942), where the
court said that § 75 "is not designed to aid farm hands, farm tenants, share croppers or
others who may follow farming as a vocation to newly acquire and hold farm property."
See 5 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 150-1 (14th ed. 1943).
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or structures which he had erected on the land, it would seem that he should
be entitled to avail himself of farm bankruptcy proceedings. While the
Lemke bill maintains the ambliguous silence of 75 (r) on the status of tenant
farmers, the N.B.C. bill seems clearly to include them among the benefi-
ciaries of the Chapter."
An unfortunate result reached under 75(r)'s definition was the Supreme
Court's ruling that the administrator or executor of a deceased farmer could
not initiate or continue proceedings under Section 75 without the consent of
the state probate court.m Adopting the position of the commentators30 and
the dissenting justices,37 both bills do away with this rule.
CONCILIATION COMMISSIONMa
While the N.B.C. bill abolishes the position of Conciliation Commissioner
and provides instead for the reference of the proceedings to a referee in
bankruptcy, the Lemke bill retains, with some changes, the office of Concilia-
tion Commissioner.35 Under the Lemke bill, as under Section 75, the Commis-
sioner must be familiar with agricultural conditions in the community and
must not be engaged in farm credit activities. These qualifications attempt to
exclude from the position the farm creditor class and insure the appointment
of individuals in sympathy with the farmer's problems.30 In addition it is pro-
vided that a referee or special master may not be appointed or serve as a Con-
ciliation Commissioner. This is apparently designed to meet the criticism that
referees are creditor-minded and tend to be unduly legalistic in their admin-
istration.4 Since farm bankruptcy proceedings are intended to be heavily
34. The N.B.C. bill uses the phrase "whether so engaged personally or as a tenant or
by tenants." [Emphasis supplied.]
35. Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447 (1943).
36. The decision of the Utah court, affirmed by the Supreme court, is criticized in
Note, 8 U. CHL L. Rnv. 532 (1941). The Supreme Court's decision is questioned in Note,
43 Coi. L. REv. 516 (1943), and 5 Couawm, Bxu murca y 158 n. 46 (14th ed. 1943).
37. justices Douglas, Black, and Murphy dissented on the grounds that §8 of the
Bankruptcy Act was determinative and that the Bankruptcy Act, not local probate law,
controlled the administration of a bankrupt's estate. 317 U.S. 447, 453-6 (1943).
38. Lemke bill §§ 903-9. The Conciliation Commissioner's term of office is extended
to four years and his jurisdiction is made co-extensive with that of the court. However, he
is no longer required, as he was by § 75 (q), to act, in effect, as the farmer's attorney.
This is apparently designed to meet the criticism that a Conciliation Commissioner should
not perform simultaneously the duties of judge and advocate. See Hearings before House
Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 7528 and S. 1935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 48 (1940); 5
CoLLn, BAxxwnus'-cs 135 (14th ed. 1943).
39. In reporting out the original § 75 (a) listing the qualifications for Conciliation
Commissioner, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that "the plan outlined here
for his appointment necessarily prejudices him in favor of fhe farmer." Str. REP. No.
1215, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1933).
40. See testimony of Elmer McClain to the effect that referees are opposed to § 75,
in Hearings Before House Committee on Judiciary on HR. 6452 and S. 2215, 75th Cong.,
2d and 3d Sess. 63 (1937-8).
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weighted in favor of the debtor and to be simple, convenient, and non-tech-
nical,41 the Lemke bill's retention of the office of Conciliation Commisgioner
with its excluding qualifications would appearoto be a desirable policy ob-
jective.
However, the Lemke bill appears weak from the standpoint of practical
administration, since it may not be feasible to find qualified men willing to
assume the job. In addition to the qualifications listed above, the prospective
Commissioner must possess all the qualifications of a referee in bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, his compensation for what might be five years' work, though
increased over that formerly allowed, is limited to seventy-five dollars plus
administration expenses.42 Under Section 75, some district judges found it
impossible to locate men who were qualified and willing to accept appoint-
ments as Conciliation Commissioners.43 As a result the procedure for ap-
pointment specified in 75 (a) was relaxed in 1944,44 and in 1946 Section 35
was amended to permit referees to act as Conciliation Commissioners, 4  a
procedure which some judges had been previously following of necessity.40
With the even more exclusive qualifications in the Lemke bill, it seems likely
that considerable difficulty would be encountered in finding suitable Commis-
sioners.
Were the qualifications enumerated in the Lemke bill changed to permit the
appointment of a referee as Conciliation Commissioner where it is impossible
to find a qualified individual, the desirable features of the office would be
retained in many districts without putting insuperable obstacles in the way of
41. See 5 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 126 (14th ed. 1943).
42. Lemke bill, § 961. The Conciliation Commissioner's compensation is directly de-
pendent upon the number of cases filed in his district. This seems less desirable than the
recent Referee's Salary Act which placed referees on a salary basis, independent of the
fees taxed in the cases referred to a given referee. Pub. L. No. 464, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(June 28, 1946) ; 11 U.S.C.A. § 68 (Supp. 1946). It would seem that the Lemke bill
should be amended to place Conciliation Commissioners on a salary independent of the
number of petitions filed before a given commissioner.
43. Hearings Before House Committee "on Judiciary on H.R. 7356, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, 5-10, 16, 21, 23-6 (1942) ; H.R. REP. No. 1127, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1944).
44. Subsection 75(a) had previously required that a Conciliation Commissioner be
appointed for every agricultural county having a population of five hundred or more farm-
ers and that he be a resident of the count in which he was to act. 48 STAT. 925 (1934).
The amendment of 1944 provided that not more than twenty Conciliation Commissioners
should be appointed in any one district and that such commissioner need only be a resident
of the district. 58 STAT. 113 (1944), 11 U.S.C. § 203(a) (Supp. 1945). By thus expand-
ing the residency requirement from the county to the district, the draftsmen felt that the
judge's job of finding qualified Conciliation Commissioners would be made easier. H.R.
Rm. No. 1127, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1944).
45. Pub. L. No. 464, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3 (June 28, 1946), 11 U.S.C.A. § 63
(Supp. 1946). See SEN. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946), quoted in Bank-
ruptcy Act (Collier Pamphlet Edition 1946) 39.
46. Hearings Before House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 7356, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1942).
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practical administration in other districts. With the qualifications for the
office thus changed, it would seem that the N.B.C. bill should be amended to
include provisions for a Conciliation Commissioner.
JURISDICTION AND PowERs OF THE COURT
Under both bills the court has jurisdiction of the debtor and his property
wherever located. As in the former 75 (n), property is broadly defined so as
to foreclose any possible narrow judicial constructions. The jurisdiction,
powers, and duties of both the trial and appellate courts are the same as in a
regular bankruptcy proceeding. The N.B.C. bill's article dealing with the
jurisdiction and powers of the courts is modelled on the jurisdictional articles
of Chapters X through XIII. 7 It expressly gives the court the power to
permit the rejection of executory contracts, which by definition include
leases, thus supplying an omission in the former Section 75. Detailed, clear,
and concise, the. N.B.C. bill here seems superior in draftsmanship to the
Lemke bill, which is largely a re-working of the old phrases in the former
subsections 75 (n), (o), and (p). 48
PETITION, APPROVAL, AND STAY
Under Section 75, a condition precedent to the farmer's taking advantage
of subsection (s), which provided for a moratorium and a scaling dovm of
secured debts, was an attempted composition or extension agreement under
subsections (a) to (r). Since the farmer always had the option of proceeding
into subsection (s) by stating that he was "aggrieved" by the composition or
-extension agreement and since subsection (s) was the essential objective of
47. A tabulation of each section in Article III of the N.B.C. bill and. its similar sec-
-ion in other Chapters of the Bankruptcy Act follows:
§ 911-identical with present §§ 111, 311, 411
§ 912-identical with present § 112
§ 913--identical with present § 114
§ 914-identical with present § 116
§ 914(1)-identical with §§ 313(1), 413(1), 613(l)
§914(2)--similar to present §§ 119, 313(3), 413(3), 613(2)
§ 915-similar to present §§ 120, 315, 415, 615
§ 916-similar to present § 118
§ 917-reverses rule of Harris v. Zio's Sahings Ban & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447
(1943). See notes 35-7 .supra.
§ 918-identical with present §§ 121, 316, 416, 616
48. A tabulation of each section in Article IV of the Lernke bill and its counterpart
:in Section 75 follows:
§ 911-first sentence substantially the same as first sentence of § 75(n). Second sen-
tence spedfies that "such filing shall be notice to all persons and all Federal
and State officials and to all Federal and State courts." This sentence is dis-
cussed infra p. 995.
§ 912-Substantially the same as fifth sentence of § 75(s) (4). This section is dis-
cussed infra p. 996.
§ 913-Substantially the same as last sentence of § 75 (n)
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Section .75,49 subsections (a) to (r) accomplished little and became mere
formalities which had to be complied with,60 and incidentally offered a means
by which the proceedings could be drawn out and a longer moratorium in
effect obtained.5 ' Accordingly both bills do away with the attempted composi-
tion or extension agreement as a condition precedent to a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy and recourse to the moratorium and debt-scaling provisions.
2
Instead, a plan of composition or extension is now to be attempted, if at all,
during the moratorium period.
The proceedings under both bills are commenced by the filing of a petition
stating that the farmer is insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature
and that he desires to avail himself of the benefits of the Chapter. 3 Each bill
49. Under § 75(a)-(r), the plan of composition or extension had to be approved by
a majority in number and amount of all creditors. Acquiring the approval of a majority
in number might not be too difficult, but, since the mortgagee was almost always the
largest creditor, the approval of a majority in amount was usually impossible to acquire.
See Comment, 44 YALE L J. 651, 652-3 (1935); Comment, 43 YALE L. J. 1285, 1287
(1934). But while the mortgagee had an effective veto power under §75(a)-(r), his
claim was automatically handled by the court under § 75 (s). Thus § 75(s) with its auto-
matic debt scaling and moratorium provisions was the substantive heart of § 75. See 5
COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 127 (14 ed. 1943). But for a different, and rather unrealistic,' view
of the relation of § 75(a)-(r) to § 75(s), see remarks of Holmes, J. in Baxter v. Savings
Bank, 92 F.2d 404, 406 (C.C.A. 5th 1937).
50. See Letzler, supra note ,3, at 1164.
51. Commenting on legislation pending in 1940 which proposed, inter alia, to do away
with an attempted composition agreement as a condition precedent to the moratorium
provisions, Congressman Lemke had the following to say about § 75(a)-(r) : "It is a
waste of time and litigation .... By taking all of this preliminary matter [§ 75(a)-
(r)] out of the picture, in the first place the farmer will not be continuously involved in
litigation and wasting his time thereon in place of taking care of his farm and handling
his crops, and it will shorten the period under which he can hold the property, because
when that is done he knows that he has three years." Hearings Before House Corn-
mittee on Judiciary on H.R. 7528 and S. 1935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11, 22-3 (1940).
On the same subject, Referee Kruse said, "I think he [Lemke] is right about that.
In a good many cases the proceedings linger along under these provisions [§ 75(a) - (r) ]
and no rents are fixed ... and it goes along for 2 or 3 years before they come to a
point where they make an order fixing the rents." Id. at 46.
52. Such an amendment has been previously suggested. See supra note 51; Letzler,
supra note 3, at 1164-5.
53. A tabulation of the sections in Article IV of the N.B.C. bill follows:
§921-identical with §§321, 621.
§922 - substantially similar to §128. Filing fee increased to $45.
§923-contents of petition.
§924- statement of executory contracts, statement of affairs, and schedules
to accompany petition.
§925 - approval of petition.
§926- enacts rule of John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308
U.S. 180 (1939).
§927- provisions for automatic stay.
§928- substantially similar to second sentence of §75(n).
The following is a tabulation of the sections in Article V of the Lemkc bill:
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provides that a prior discharge in bankruptcy shall not bar a Chapter XVI
proceeding.5 In addition the N.B.C. bill specifies that the prior confirmation
of an arrangement or plan shall not preclude the initiation of farm bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Under the N.B.C. bill a Chapter XVI proceeding may be
commenced by the filing of an original petition or by the filing of a petition in
a pending bankruptcy proceeding either before or after adjudication5a
Though the Lemke bill seems to contemplate that a pending bankruptcy pro-
ceeding may be transformed into a Chapter XVI proceeding, the language it
employs is unfortunately not as clear. 0 Similar language was used in Sec-
tion 75, but the courts were not always willing to hold that a proceeding
already commenced in general bankruptcy could, after adjudication, be trans-
formed into a Section 75 proceeding.'7 The N.B.C. bill seems clearly to
dispose of these narrow judicial rulings, while the Lemke bill leaves their
status unchanged.
Under the provisions of both bills, the filing of a petition operates as an
automatic stay of all proceedings against the debtor or his property.08 In addi-
tion the Lemke bill, as if to insure against any possible reversal of previous
judicial construction, provides that the filing shall be notice to all persons and
all federal and state courts and officials.rm Under the N.B.C. bill the stay
continues automatically for the life of the proceedings, while the Lemke bill
provides that the automatic stay is operative only until the time of the order
continuing the debtor in possession, at which time it is necessary for the court
§921 - filing of petition. Petition to be accompanied by schedules and inven-
tory
§922-provisions for automatic stay
§923 - identical with second sentence of §75(n)
§924-provisions for entry of judicial stay
§925-provisions for extending moratorium up to two additional years
9Z6 -provisions for procedure on farmer's failure to redeem
54. Lemke bill §981; N.B.C. bill §1043. This was so under §75(s) (5). 5 Cormn,
BANzRu TcY 211 (14th ed. 1943).
55. N.B.C. bill, §§921, 922.
56. Section 981 of the Lemke bill employs the same language as in the last sentence
of §75(s) (5). For an example of how one court construed this sentence to mean the
-direct opposite of the apparent intent of the words, see In re Reichert, 13 F.Supp. 1, 7
(W.D.Ky. 1936).
57. Pearce v. Coller, 92 F.2d 237 (C.C.A.3d 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 745 (1937);
Comment, 48 YALE L. J. 859, 862-3 (1939). But cf. 5 Coma, BA-xxnup-c 211-2 (14th
,ed. 1943).
58. Lemke bill, §922; N.B.C. bill, §927. Section 75 did not, in so many words, specify
that the filing of a petition operated as a stay. But this omission vas corrected by judicial
construction. It was said that the effect of §75(n), (o), and (p) was to make the filing
of a petition operate as an automatic stay of all proceedings against the debtor and his
property. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) ; 5 COLI m B, mmurcy 180 (14th
-ed. 1943) ; Letzler, supra note 3, at 1156; see Adair v. Bank of America, 303 U.S. 350,
.355 (1938).
59. Lemke bill, §911. This provision codifies the judicial rule that no notice of the
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to enter a judicial stay. From the point of view of simplicity of the proceed-
ings and the avoidance of a possible hiatus between the stays, the N3.C. bill
here appears superior.60
A potent barrier to relief under Section 75 during its early years was the
judicial pronouncement of the so-called "good faith rule." Under this rule,
lack of good faith was imputed to a farmer who had no reasonable probability
of financial rehabilitation. Accordingly, since his petition was not filed in
good faith, he was denied relief and his petition was dismissed.,1 This judi-
cially contrived rule was finally buried by the Supreme Court in John Han-
cock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels.62 Although the Bartels case was
viewed with mixed sentiment by the commentators, 3 it seems eminently desir-
able since it took away what had been a potent weapon in the hands of credi-
tor-minded judges. Employing substantially the language used in the Su-
preme Court's opinion, the N.B.C. bill" specifically enacts the rule of the
'Bartels case while the Lemke bill"' incorporates its holding by implication.
Both bills make it clear that as long as the farmer has some interest left in
his property, no matter how remote it may be, he may avail himself of the
provisions of the Chapter.60 In addition to giving the debtor the right, upon
filing of a petition was necessary to stay proceedings and divest non-bankruptcy courts
of jurisdiction. Trego v. Wright, 111 F.2d 990 (C.C.A. 6th 1940).
60. Under §75 the notion was that the automatic stay provided for by §75(a)-(r)
was terminated upon the debtor's adjudication under §75 (s). Thereafter it became neces-
sary for the court to enter a judicial stay under §75(s) (2). Hardt v. Kirkpatrick, 91
F.2d 875 (C.C.A.9th 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 626 (1938) ; Buttars v. Utah Mort-
gage Loan Corp., 116 F.2d 622 (C.C.A.10th 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 572 (1941);
see In re Mahaffey, 129 F.2d 292, 294 (C.C.A. 2d 1942). The stay could not be entered
under §75(s) (2) until certain conditions precedent had been complied with. Beecher v.
Federal Land Bank, 153 F.2d 982 (C.C.A.9th 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 871 (1946).
The resulting probability of a hiatus between stays, during which creditors could pursue
their normal rights, is apparent. The farmer could escape this dilemma by applying for
a temporary stay upon adjudication. Bakersfield Abstract Co. v. Buckley, 100 F.2d 530
(C.C.A.9th 1938). It has been suggested that the Hardt case was overruled by Kalb v.
Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). See Note, (1940) Wis. L. REv. 424; Letzler, supra
note 3, at 1162. But this suggestion does not seem to be supported by subsequent judicial
,decision. 5 CoLLER, BAuxzaurrcy 182 (14th ed. 1943).
61. The former "good faith" rule is discussed in" 5 COLLER, BANKRUP=CV 217-8
(14th ed. 1943) ; Letzler, supra note 3, at 1141-51; Comment, 48 YAL= L. J. 859, 865-71
-(1939).
62. 308 U.S. 180 (1939).
63. Deplored in 87 U. PA. L. REv. 739 and 26 VA. L. REv. 817 (1940). Approved in
8 GEo. WAsr. L. Rv. 853 (1940) and 53 HARv. L. Rnv. 872 (1940).
64. N.B.C. bill, § 926.
65. Lemke bill, § 926.
66. Lemke bill, § 911 (similar to § 75 (n), first sentence), § 923 (similar to § 75 (n)
second sentence). N.B.C. bill, § 906 (10) (similar to first and second sentences of
§ 75. (n)), .§ 928 (similar to § 75 (n), second sentence). The broad definition of
"property" empoyed in § 75 and carried over into both pending bills is discussed In 5
COLLIm, BA.xRuprcv 182-90 (14th ed. 1943). For illustration of the broad sweep of
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approval of his petition, to immediate possession of the property in the hands
of a receiver or trustee, both bills provide that he shall have the right to im-
mediate possession of property in the hands of a pledgee, mortgagee, or trus-
tee under a deed of trust.6 7
PROCEEFDNGS SUBSEQUENT TO APPROVAL OF PETITION
The articles of the two bills dealing with events subsequent to the approval
of the farmer's petition differ considerably both in substance and procedure.
Under the Lemke bill,68 the proceeding is referred to the Conciliation Com-
missioner, who has the farmer's property appraised, sets off to the farmer his
exemptions, and continues the farmer in possession for the duration of the
moratorium. The method of appraisal contemplated by the Lemke bill departs
considerably from that provided in 75 (s). Each item of property that ex-
ceeds twenty-five dollars and each subdivision or separate parcel of land is to
be individually appraised. 9 The farmer and his creditors must first attempt
an appraisal by negotiation.70 If they fail to reach an agreement, three dis-
interested appraisers are to be appointed to appraise the property at its fair
and reasonable market value.73 If the farmer or a majority in number and
amount of his creditors feel aggrieved by the appraisal valuation, it is to be
reviewed, and approved or modified, by the Conciliation Commissioner. Only
this definition, see Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325 (1943); Wright v.
Logan, 315 U.S. 139 (1942) ; but cf. State Bank of Hardinsburg v. Brown, 317 U.S. 135
(1942); In re Brown, 118 F. 2d 871 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), ccrt. denied, 314 U.S. C07
(1941).
67. Lemke bill § 912; N.B.C. bill § 1037. The Lemke bill is modelled in phraseology
on the fourth sentence of § 75 (s) (4), adding the words "mortgagee or trustee". The
N.B.C. bill is modelled on § 257 and § 537, but adds a provision for the debtor's right to
immediate possession of property in possession of a pledgee under a pledge.
Under § 75 at least one court indicated that there might be some doubt whether the
language in the fourth sentence of § 75 (s) (4) was broad enough to entitle the debtor
on filing his petition to possession of property in the possession of the mortgagee. See
In re Casaudounmecq, 46 F. Supp. 718, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1942). Both bills are now so worded
as to remove any ground for doubt. Under § 257 of Chapter % on which the N.B.C. bill
provision is modelled, "even when the mortgagee is in possession following foreclosure
and sale, the court may demand possession so long as the debtor has an equity under
the controlling state law.' 6 Cor-uz, BAxrxuPTcy 5015 (14th ed. 1943). Cf. In re Frank-
lin Garden Apartments Inc., 124 F. 2d 451 (C.C.A. 2d 1941).
68. Proceedings subsequent to filing of the farmer's petition are treated in Article
VI, §931-40 of the Lemke bill.
69. Lemke bill § 932. It was held under § 75 that separate valuation of each sub-
division of land was not authorized. Paradise Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land
Bank, 140 F. 2d 102 (C.C.A. 10th 1944); see Rait v. Federal Land Banh, 135 F. 2d
447, 452 (C.C-A. 8th, 1943).
70. Under § 75 (s) voluntary negotiation of an appraisal value was not required.
Appraisers were to be appointed immediately upon petition of the debtor.
71. The standard to be used under § 75 (s) was the same; i.e., "then fair and reason-
able market value." This standard is discussed in 5 CoLLIan, BAmrmUPCy 214-5 (14th
ed. 1943).
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bona fide residents of the county may testify at the hearings before the Con-
ciliation Commissioner."2 An appeal from the order of the Conciliation Com-
missioner may be taken to the District Court by the farmer or a majority in
number and amount of his creditors.
After his property has been appraised and his exemptions set off to him, the
farmer apparently may then select that part of his property which he wishes
to redeem and retain permanently. 73 The Conciliation Commissioner there-
upon enters an order continuing the farmer in possession of the property
which he has selected for the duration of the moratorium.74 At this point, the
court enters a stay of all proceedings against the farmer and his chosen prop-
erty.75 That property not selected by the farmer: is released from the protec-
tion of the initial legislative stay.76 Since the farmer apparently has a second
opportunity to choose which part of his property he will retain when the time
for redemption arrives, it seems probable that he would not make his choice
until that later period.77
The Lemke bill apparently contemplates that the farmer shall pay no rental
on the property retained in his possession during the moratorium period.
Instead he is to pay into court annually or semi-annually "not less than one-
fourth of the gross or one-half of the net (whichever is designated by the
court) farm income. '78 This sum is to be used first for the payment of taxes,
insurance, and upkeep of the property, and the remainder is to be applied as a
payment on the principal amount of the redemption price of the property.70
Since it amply pr9tects the creditor and increases the probability of the farm-
er's retaining ownership of his farm, this provision seems eminently desir-
able. From the point of view of protecting the creditor, taxes are paid and his
security is insured and maintained. Moreover, the court may order the farmer
to make payments to the creditor on principal in addition to the excess over
72. Fear that outside experts might be prejudiced in favor of higher valuation is
apparently the motivating factor behind this provision.
73. Lemke bill, § 937. Redemption by a farmer of only part of his property, was
said to be not permissible under § 75. See Paradise Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land
Bank, 140 F. 2d 102, 103 (C.C.A. 10th 1944).
74. Lemke bill, § 937.
75. Lemke bill, § 924.
76. The Court is to enter an order continuing the stay only as to the farmer's
"property selected under section 937. . . " Ibid.
77. The second opportunity is discussed infra p. 1011.
78. Lemke bill, § 938.
79. The words employed are: "... the remainder to be applied on the value estab-
lished as provided in this chapter, and to be distributed among the secured and unsecured
creditors as their interests may appear". Lemke bill § 939.
It is conceivable that one quarter of the gross or one half of the net farm income
might not be sufficient to meet payments on taxes, insurance, and upkeep. But since § 938
says only that the farmer is to pay "not less than" the specified fraction of farm income,
it would seem that where this was not sufficient to meet the required payments, the court
could increase it.
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taxes, insurance and upkeep8s And from the farmer's point of view, this
provision seems salutary. Since any excess left after payment of taxes, in-
surance, and upkeep is to be applied on principal, the application of such
excess would reduce the final redemption price paid at the end of the morato-
rium. In short, all payments in excess of taxes, insurance, and upkeep inure
exclusively to the farmer's benefit.
The N.B.C. bill is quite different. It provides"' that upon approval of the
farmer's petition the proceedings are to be referred to a referee who has the
property appraised, sets off to the farmer his exemptions, determines the
rental to be paid, and enters an order continuing the farmer in possession for
the duration of the moratorium. Instead of requiring an initial attempt to
arrive at an appraisal value by negotiation, the bill provides that three ap-
praisers shall be promptly appointed to appraise the farmer's real and per-
sonal property, at its fair and reasonable market value.82 As in the Lemke
bill, each item of real and personal property, is, as far as practicable, to be in-
ventoried and appraised separately.83 Upon completion of the appraisal, the
farmer files a statement of the property which he wishes to retain in his pos-
session and an offer of the amount and terms of rental to be paid.s  There-
upon the court calls the first meeting of creditors6 After hearing objections
at the creditor meetings to the appraisers' report, the referee enters an order
either approving, modifying, or disapproving the report.80 In case of disap-
proval, a hearing is held and an order entered determining the fair and rea-
sonable market value of the property.87 Any person aggrieved by the order
entered by a referee may have it reviewed under regular bankruptcy appellate
procedure.8 8
At the creditors' meetings, the rental to be paid by the farmer during the
moratorium is to be fixed according to certain flexible standards specified in
the bill.89 During the moratorium the court may, upon hearing, -ary the
amount of the rental and in addition require the debtor to make payments on
80. Lemke bill § 940. There was a similar provision in § 75 (s) (2), last sentence.
81. Proceedings subsequent to approval of the farmer's petition are treated in
Article V, §§ 931-49 of the N.B.C. bill.
82. N.B.C. bill § 932.
83. Ibid. See supra note 69.
84. N.B.C. bill § 934.
85. N.B.C. bill § 935. Under subsection 75 (e), examination of the debtor at the
creditors' meeting was permissive only. While the provisions of the Lemke bill con-
tinue to make examination only permissive, the N.B.C. bill provides that examination
of the debtor is mandatory, thus making farm bankruptcy proceedings consistent with
other parts of the Bankruptcy Act. N.B.C. bill § 939 (1). For a previous suggestion that
examination of the debtor should be mandatory, see Letzler, supra note 3, at 1167.
86. N.B.C. bill § 942.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. N.B.C. bill § 945.
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the principal amount of the appraisal value. 0° Under 75 (s) there was some
judicial conflict as to whether the excess of rental payments distributed to
creditors after payment of taxes and upkeep was to be considered a payment
on princijal and thus deductible from the redemption price.01 - Since the
N.B.C. bill provides that only those sums which the court orders paid in addi-
tion to the fixed rental are to be deductible from the redemption price,92 it
seems clear that the excess of rental distributed to the creditors would not be
considered payment on principal. In providing for payment of a given portion
of farm income rather than formal rental the Lemke bill, for the reasons
previously mentioned, seems superior.
After the rental has been fixed, an order is entered continuing the farmer
in possession of the property which he requested to retain for the duration of
the moratorium.23 With respect to the property retained by him the farmer
has all the title and powers of a trustee appointed under Section 44, subject,
however, to the supervision and control of the court.94 The property which
the debtor does not retain in possession is to be administered by a trustee. 0
Upon application of a creditor and after hearing, the court may vacate the
stay affecting any such property administered by the trustee upon which a
creditor has a lawfully enforceable encumbrance.90 As in the Lemke bill, the
farmer apparently has a second opportunity to choose which property he
wants to retain permanently and so he would pr6bably defer his choice until
that time.
An unanswered question raised by the unskillful draftsmanship of Section
75 was whether a trustee might be appointed in the proceedings prior to a
liquidation and sale under the terms of 75 (s) (3).9 7 A related and similarly
unanswered question was whether there might be an avoidance of preferences,
90. N.B.C. bill §§946, 948.
91. The excess of rental after payment of taxes and upkeep is not a payment oil
principal. Farmer's Bank v. Thompson, 139 F. 2d 408 (C.C.A. 8th 1943), cert. deided,
322 U.S. 728 (1944); Wilson v. Dewey, 133 F. 2d 962 (C.C.A. 8th 1943); In re Rider,
40 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Iowa 1941). The excess of rental after payment of taxes and up-
keep is a payment on principal. In re Ezell, 45 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
92. N.B.C. bill § 948.
93. N.B.C. bill § 947.
94. The title, rights, duties, and powers of the debtor are specified in Article VI,
§§ 956-60 of the N.B.C. bill.
95. N.B:C. bill §966. At the first meeting of creditors, or at any adjournment thereof,
the creditors, exclusive of those disqualified to vote for a trustee under § 44, may appoint
a trustee. If the creditors do not appoint a trustee, the court shall make the appointment.
N.B.C. bill § 940.
96. N.B.C. bill § 927.
97. Although the terms of § 75 (s) (3) specified that a trustee was to be appointed
to liquidate the debtor's estate if the farmer failed to redeem at the end of the moratorium,
§ 75 was silent regarding the appointment of a trustee under other circumstances. Ex-
plaining the provisions of the original § 75 in 1933, Senator Hastings said, "It is not con-
templated that any trustee shall be appointed for the farmer, and therefore, the physical
possession of his property will be left with him." 76 CoNG. REc. 4879 (1933), quoted in
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fraudulent conveyances, and judicial liens in such a proceeding.05 The N.B.C.
bill clarifies both of these ambiguities. As previously mentioned, it provides
that the property not retained in the debtor's possession shall be administered
by a trustee with all the rights, powers, and title of a trustee appointed under
Section 44. Furthermore, with respect to the property retained by him, the
debtor has all the powers and title of a trustee appointed under section 44P
Therefore it would seem that the power of avoidance exists over all the
debtor's property. In contrast, the Lemke bill provides that except for a
liquidating trustee, no trustee shall be appointed.10 0 If this is taken as an
indication of policy and if it is considered along with the fact that there is no
provision for the debtor's having the title and power of a trustee, it would
seem dear that under the Lemke bill there is no power of avoidance. Al-
though it is arguable that the lack of such a power is not undesirable,1 0 ' the
provisions of the N.B.C. bill here seem preferable.
Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 18 J.N.A. REP. BA.n. 68, 70 n.22
(1944). But a trustee was appointed in the following cases: Wilson v. Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank, 105 F. 2d 302 (C.C.A. 7th 1939), ccrt. derid 303 U.S. 590 (1939)
(appointment of trustee merely mentioned by court in passing); In re Wade, 54 F. Supp.
572 (N.D. Ohio 1943) ; In re Witt Dairy Co., 48 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1942) ("liqui-
dating trustee" appointed in proceeding involving farming partnership); In re Durst,
44 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1942) (trustee appointed under undisclosed circumstances).
The Wade case was a square holding not only that § 75 authorized the appointment of a
trustee, but also that the trustee might proceed against the farmer and others to set
aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance.
On the analogous question of whether a receiver might be appointed under § 75, a
few cases have held that appointment of a receiver is authorized. Beecher v. Federal
Land Bank, 153 F. 2d 987 (C.C.A. 9th 1946) cert. denied 323 U.S. 871 (1946) (tem-
porary receiver may be appointed between date of filing petition and entry of order
continuing debtor in possession, but permanent receiver not authorized); Beecher v.
Federal Land Bank, 146 F. 2d 934, 938 (C.C.A. 9th 1944) (receiver may be appointed
under emergency conditions to prevent loss of property) ; Armold v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 83 F. 2d 530 (C.CA. 7th 1936) ; see It re Casatedouinccq, 46 F. Supp. 718, 724
(S.D. Cal. 1942).
See Oglebay, spra at 70; 5 Couzu, BA.imuirc" 227, 229 (14th ed. 1943).
98. See 5 CoLLn3n, BAmmauTcy 229-32 (14th ed. 1943). In the Wade case, supra
note 97, the court said that § 75 authorized the setting aside of fraudulent transfers.
99. N.B.C. bill § 956. This section is similar to § 342 of Chapter XI and § 444 of
Chapter XIL Since the debtor in possession under these sections has the power of avoid-
ance, it seems clear that the debtor under § 956 of the N.B.C. bill would have such power.
See 8 CoLL=a, BANKRUPTCy f 6.32 (14th ed. 1943).
Concerning the debtor's power of avoidance under § 75, it was said that "it may be
seriously doubted whether the farmer-debtor has any legal basis for taking action".
5 CoL=rm, op. cit. supra, at 229. There is broad language in a few cases to the effect
that the farmer is a trustee. Beecher v. Federal Land Bank, 153 F. 2d 932, 934 (C.C.A.
9th 1946), cert. denied 328 U.S. 871 (1946); Banter v. Emory University, 107 F. 2d
115 (C.CA. 5th 1939), cert. denied 310 U.S. 624 (1939); In re Breuer, 52 F. Supp. 932
(D.N.D. 1943). But none of them deal with the question of whether the debtor has
the power of avoidance. But cf. In re Wade, supra note 97.
100. Lemke bill § 912.
101. See 5 Cou.zm, BA.xRuprcy 231 (14th ed. 1943).
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Under section 75, the court could order sold any unexempt perishable prop-
erty of the debtor or any unexempt personal property not reasonably neces-
sary for the, debtor's farming operations.10 2 While retaining provisions
similar to this, both bills add a new feature in giving the court the power to
sell any unexempt real property not reasonably necessary to the farming
operations of the debtor. 10 3 Since under both bills, as under Section 75, the
court obtains jurisdiction of the debtor's property wherever located, 104 non-
farming property, such as city property, is subject to the court's jurisdiction
and to the moratorium and redemption provisions. As the pfirpose of farm
bankruptcy legislation is not necessarily to assist the farmer in maintaining
non-farming real estate holdings, it is arguable that the provisions of such
legislation should not extend to non-agricultural realty. Furthermore the sale
of non-agricultural property, by providing additional funds, could actually
assist the farmer to redeem the farm realty. Thus in providing the court with
permissive power to sell unexempt real property not reasonably necessary to
farming operations, both bills here appear to offer a desirable addition to farm
bankruptcy legislation.
CREDITORS AND CLAIMS
A regrettable shortcoming of Section 75 was its failure to state what claims
were provable and particularly its omission to deal with the provability of
future rent claims. 0 5 The Lemke bill continues the ambiguous silence of Sec-
tion 75, but the N.B.C. bill includes a separate article dealing with creditors
and claims.' 0 6 As in Chapters X, XII, and XIII, claims are broadly defined
so as to include all claims of whatever character against the debtor or his
102. Subsection 75(s) (2).
103. Lemke bill § 939; N.B.C. bill § 949.
104. Section 911 of the Lemke bill specifies that the filing of a petition shall subject
the farmer "and all his property . . . wherever located" to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the court. Section 906 (10) of the N.B.C. bill provides that "'property' of a debtor
shall include all his property, wherever located, of every kind and nature." Under § 75
it was held that the court took jurisdiction of all of the debtor's property, including
both real and personal property in no wise connected with farming operations, such as
city property. In re Wilkenson, 25 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Okla. 1938).
105. See 5 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 169 (14th ed. 1943).
106. Article VIII of the N.B.C. bill deals with Creditors and Claims. The follow-
ing is a tabulation of the sections in that article:
§ 976-roughly similar to § 196 and § 451.
§ 977 -roughly similar to § 197 and § 452.
§ 978 -court shall classify as unsecured any amount in excess of value,
established under this chapter, of security held by secured creditor.
§ 979 - identical with § 200.
§980-persons injured by rejected contracts deemed creditors. Landlord's
claim under rejected lease governed by § 63 (a) (9).
§ 981- provisions for claims in a proceeding commenced in regular bank-
ruptcy.
§ 982-provisions for claims in a proceeding remitted to regular bankruptcy.
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property, whether or not provable as debts under Section 63.107 Following
similar provisions in Chapters X and XII, the bill also provides that the court
shall prescribe the manner in which and fix a time within which proofs of
claim may be filed and allowed. 0 s The court may divide creditors into classes
and must classify as unsecured any amount in excess of the appraisal value of
the security held by a secured creditor?" In case the court authorizes rejec-
tion of an unexpired lease, the landlord's claim for damages is governed by
the provisions of Section 63(a) (9) of the Bankruptcy Act." 0  In thus sup-
plying what was an unfortunate omission in Section 75, the N.B.C. bill seems
here superior to the Lemke bill.
PLAN OF COMPOSITION op ExTENsioN
While negotiations for a plan of composition or extension were a condition
precedent to the debtor's availing himself of the moratorium provisions under
Section 75, n both bills now provide that such a plan, if attempted at all, is
to be negotiated during the moratorium. The N.B.C. bill" 2 provides that the
debtor must file his plan of composition or extension not later than two years
after the beginning of the moratorium. 13 The possible scope of a plan is
practically unlimited. It shall alter the rights of creditors, secured or unse-
cured, upon any terms or for any consideration, may deal with all or any part
of the debtor's property, and may provide for the rejection of executory con-
tracts.11 4
If the plan has been accepted by all creditors affected thereby, the court is to
confirm it if satisfied that the plan and its acceptance are in good faith and
have not been made or procured by means, promises or acts forbidden by the
Bankruptcy Act.n- If the plan has not been accepted by all creditors, then the
107. Claims are defined in §906 (1) in language similar to that used in §406 (2),
with the addition of the phrase "whether private or public or held by a Federal or State
agency or corporation". See infra note 171.
108. N.B.C. bill § 976.
109. N.B.C. bill §§ 977,978.
110. N.B.C. bill § 980.
111. See supra p. 993.
112. Article IV of the N.B.C. bill, embracing § 986 through § 1003, deals with the plan
of composition and extension.
113. N.B.C. bill § 986. If the proposed plan of composition or extension is still pend-
ing at the end of the moratorium, the moratorium is to be continued until the plan is
acted upon. §§ 996, 1006.
114. N.B.C. bill § 988. Under § 75 (k) a plan could not reduce the amount of or
impair the lien of any secured creditor below the fair and reasonable market value of
the property securing such lien. Section 988 of the N.B.C. bill apparently contemplates
no such limitation.
115. N.B.C. bill § 989. There was no provision in § 75 for confirmation of a pro-
posal which had been accepted by all creditors, although an amendment to incorporate
such a provision was suggested. See Letzler supra note 3, at 1167. A similar provision is
found in § 361 of Chapter XI and § 467 of Chapter XII.
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court may confirm it if it has been accepted by a majority in number and
amount of unsecured and a majority in number and amount of secured credi-
tors, voting by class.n" Non-assenting secured creditors need only be paid the
appraisal value of the property securing their debts. 117 Since a secured credi-
tor can be dealt with under the redemption provisions of the Chapter by pay-
ing him the appraisal value of his security, this provision, though new, appears
logical and sound.
One of the strong criticisms of subsections 75 (a) to (r) was that compli-
ance with the provisions of Section 14(c) was not a condition precedent to
judicial confirmation of a plan of composition or extension.11s Since six of
the seven grounds on which a refusal of discharge may be based under 14(c)
are predicated on the debtor's personal misconduct, it seemed inequitable not
to penalize the farmer equally with other debtors in case of wrongdoings, Ac-
cordingly the N.B.C. bill soundly provides that, with the exception of a prior
discharge granted or a prior composition or extension confirmed, all acts
which would be a bar to a discharge under 14(c) shall also be a bar to con-
firmation of a plan.1 19 If, after the confirmation of a plan, ° the debtor is
found to have been guilty of fraud in connection with his plan, the court may,
as one possible alternative,121 adjudge the debtor a bankrupt and direct that
116. N.B.C. bill § 990. A similar provision is found in § 362 of Chapter XI and § 468
of Chapter XII. Under § 75 (g), secured and unsecured creditors were "apparently" to
vote as one class. See 5 "CoLLiE, BANKRUPTCY 173 (14th ed. 1943).
Section 991 contemplates that the farmer may obtain written acceptance of creditors
before as well as after filing of the proposed plan. Such an amendment, which would
speed up the procedure, was suggested for § 75. See Letzler, sutra note 3, at 1167, A
similar provision is included in § 336 (4) of Chapter XI, § 436 (4) of Chapter XII, and
§ 633 (3) of Chapter XIII.
117. N.B.C. bill § 988 (14).
118. In It re Feil, 46 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Wash. 1942), it was held that the com-
mission by the debtor of an act which would be a bar to a discharge in bankruptcy under
§ 14 will not prevent confirmation of a proposal under § 75 (a) - (r). For criticism of
this omission in § 75, see testimony of J. I. Weinstein in Hearings Before House Committee
on Judiciary on H.R. 6452 and S. 2215, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1937-8).
119. N.B.C. bill § 997 (5). Such an amendment to § 75 has been previously suggested.
See Letzler, supra note 3, at 1168 n. 117.
120. The procedure for confirmation is set out in §§ 990-1008. Sections 993-5 provide
that the debtor may, after his plan has been accepted, propose alterations and modifica-
tions. Section 997 specifies the standards to be applied in confirming the plan. Section 998,
subsection (1) of which is identical with § 657 of Chapter XIII, provides for post-
confirmation procedure. Section 999 provides for continuing jurisdiction of a plan of
extension. Under § 1000, the confirmation of a plan is to discharge the debtor from all
debts and liabilities provided for by the plan except such debts as are not dischargeable
under § 17. Section 1001 includes provisions for closing the case. Under § 1002, if, before
the expiration of the moratorium, the plan is withdrawn or abandoned or is not ac-
cepted, or if the consideration required to be deposited is not deposited or the applica-
tion for confirmation is not filed, or if confirmation is refused, the court is to terminate
that part of the proceeding.
121. As other alternatives, the court may (1) set the confirmation aside, reinstate the
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regular bankruptcy be proceeded with. One of the two exceptions in the
N.B.C. bill to the Section 4b rule that a farmer may not be made an involun-
tary bankrupt, this provision is a new and rather strong sanction, but appears
desirable in view of the cause which would evoke it.
The provisions of the Lemke bill'22 dealing with a plan of composition or
extension are singularly brief and incomplete, suggesting that a detailed Gen-
eral Order would be necessary to implement the procedure. The farmer may
offer terms of composition or extension apparently at any time before the
expiration of the moratorium.= This proposal is to be made the basis of
negotiations at which the Conciliation Commissioner is to preside and endeavor
to bring about a just and equitable agreement. The composition shall not be
less than the appraisal value of the property, 4'- but the future rate of interest
on all the farmer's debts is limited to four percent.= As was the case under
Section 75, secured and unsecured creditors would apparently vote together
and not by class.' - To be given judicial confirmation, the plan must include
"an equitable and feasible method of liquidation for secured and unsecured
creditors and of the financial rehabilitation for the farmer-debtor."127 As
under Section 75, the debtor's commission of an act which would be a bar to a
discharge in bankruptcy under Section 14(c) would not prevent confirmation
of the plan.2s No provision is made either for possible continuing jurisdic-
proceedings, and hear proposals for altering or modifying the plan to correct the fraud,
or (2) reinstate the'proceedings and modify or alter the plan to correct the fraud,
provided that the interests of non-assenting parties who did not participate in the fraud or
innocent purchasers for value are not adversely affected. N.B.C bill § 1003. Regular
bankruptcy may be ordered only if the debtor has been guilty of or has participated in
or has had knowledge of the fraud before confirmation and failed to inform the court.
122. "Article VII of the Lemke bill, embracing two short sections, deals with com-
positions and e-xtensions. Those provisions are briefer even than those in § 75 (a)-(r).
123. Failure to specify a time within which a plan must be proposed raises a number
of questions. Suppose the farmer proffers his plan on the last day of the moratorium.
Since there is no provision for extending the stay under such circumstances, it would
seem that the stay would expire. On the other hand, if the stay is continued beyond the
moratorium period while a plan is pending, then by filing his plan on the last day the
farmer can obtain for himself a longer respite from his creditors than the bill Otherwise
contemplates.
124. If this means that the lien of a secured creditor cannot be reduced below the
appraisal value of his security, then the purpose of this limitation seems questionable.
Since under the redemption provisions the debtor need only pay the appraisal value of the
property anyway, it is difficult to see what incentive there would be for the debtor's at-
tempting a composition or extension other than to obtain additional time.
125. This provision expressly overrules judicial decision under §75 (a)-(r) to the
contrary; i.e. Bogart v. Miller Land & Livestock Co., 129 F. 2d 772 (C.C.A. 9th 1942),
cert. devied, 317 U.S. 690 (1942).
126. See 5 CLLIm, BAwxZnuprcy 173 n. la (14th ed. 1943).
127. Lemke bill § 952.
128. See notes 118-9 .supra. It is arguable that under § 902, which makes applicable
the provisions of Chapters I to VII when not inconsistent, § 14(c) would apply here.
But the drafters of the N.B.C. bill, which also contains a similar § 902, apparently thought
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tion after confirmation, or for setting aside a plan when it appears after con-
firmation that fraud has been practised.m-
Although it is questionable whether the composition or extension provisions
of either bill would be much used, the N.B.C. bill here appears in every way
superior. Substantively it is more equitable and workable; procedurally it is
more clear and complete.
REDE PTION AND DISMISSAL
The redemption provisions of the proposed bills embody the substantive
heart of the relief contemplated for the distressed farmer.130 In essence they
provide that by paying into court the fair market value of the encumbered
property, the debtor acquires title free and clear of all encumbrances. If the
fair market value of the security has not fallen below the value of the debt
which it secures, the creditor has obviously lost nothing. But where, as was
frequently the case in the 1930's, the fair market value has plummeted below
the value of the debt secured,' 3 ' the creditor, compelled to take the appraisal
value of his security rather than the security itself in discharge of the debt,
has thrust on his shoulders to that extent the loss incurred by falling market
values. However, since the price which the property would bring at judicial
sale and the fair market value of the property are theoretically the same, from
the short-term viewpoint the creditor would lose nothing.8 2 As a practical
matter, in the absence of moratory legislation, he commonly bids in the prop-
erty himself at judicial sale and retains it until market values have again
risenls--meanwhile leasing to a farmer, often the former debtor. When the
silence was ambiguous, and so included a specific provision making compliance with
§ 14(c) a condition precedent to confirmation. The Lemke bill's omission of such a
reference to § 14(c) at least makes questionable the contention that § 14(c) would apply.
129. Both § 75 (m) and the N.B.C. bill § 1003 provide for setting aside a plan where
it appears within six months of confirmation that fraud has been practised. And both
§ 75 (1) and the N.B.C. bill § 999 provide for possible continuing jurisdiction of an ex-
tension plan.
130. The redemption provisions of the Lemke Bill are embodied in § 941. Article X of
the N.B.C. Bill, embracing §§ 1006-1010, deals with redemption.
131. "If such an appraisal were made at the depth of the depression, there was much
likelihood that it would be less than the amount of the first mortgage." WooDRuFF, FARM
MORTGAGE LOANS OF Lnm INsURANcE COMPANiES 119-20 (1937).
132. See Letzler, mipra note 3, at 1153.
133. Most of the life insurance companies, who hold a large percentage of the farm
mortgage debt, follow a long range program in handling the land they acquire through
foreclosure. "They have . . . held on to the land until prices have improved and the land
could be sold to owner-operators at prices which are high enough so that they are going to
come out without loss on the real estate they acquired by reason of the loans made in the
last boom period. . . .Because of their policy of . . .hanging on to the farms until values
came back, they are getting out of their real estate account without loss to the policy-
holders, and if prices continue to increase they may have a profit'. Austin, A Reappraisal
of the Frazier-Lenike Act and Its Operation, Proceedings of the Legal Section of the
American Life Convention (1946) 9, 41. See WOODRUFF, op. cit supra note 131, at 120.
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property market has apparently reached its peak, the creditor sells the farm,
possibly by mortgage to the former debtor, thus recovering his original loan
and probably taking a profit in addition. Accordingly, from the long-term
point of view, it is only fair to concede that it is no small loss which the credi-
tor thus incurs by being deprived of the opportunity to hold and resell the
property. If the creditor is an individual investor, such as an elderly farmer
who has sold his farm by mortgage and retired to live on the income from it,
his loss is painfully apparent. But, in the case of institutional investors, the
overriding policy consideration of maintaining the farmer as owner of his
farm and of shifting the loss of cyclical land value fluctuations from indi-
vidual farmers to institutional investors would appear to outweigh the long-
term loss to the latter.
The redemption sections of both bills would most probably have been con-
sidered repugnant to the Constitution twelve years ago. But a consideration
of subsequent constitutional development in this field makes it clear that they
are now well within the proper scope of bankruptcy legislationYm
134. In Louisvlle Joint Stock Land Bmk v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), the orig-
inal subsection 75(s) was held unconstitutional because, in depriving the mortgagee of
five specified property rights, it was said to be repugnant to the Fifth Amendment. As
enumerated by the Court these five rights of the mortgagee were: (1) the right to retain
the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid; (2) the right to realize upon the
security by a judicial public sale; (3) the right to determine when such sale shall be
held, subject only to the discretion of the court; (4) the right to protect its interest
in the property by bidding at such sale; (5) the right to control the property during the
period of default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents and
profits collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt. 295 U.S. 555, 594-5 (1935).
Congress immediately thereafter enacted a newv subsection 75(s) designed to meet the
constitutional objections raised in the Radford case. 49 STAr. 943 (1935). The new sub-
section was given a constitutional bill of clean health by a unanimous court in Wright v.
Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937), 37 Coi- L. Rm. 1005 (approved), 23 V. L Rv.
944 (deplored). See Comment, 35 ficH. L. Ray. 1130 (1937). Stating that it was satis-
fied that the mortgagee's rights were adequately protected, the Court at the same time
commenced a retreat from its extreme position in the Radford case by asserting that the
Radford opinion did not hold that the deprivation of any one of the five rights would
by itself have rendered the Act invalid. 300 U.S. 440, 457 (1937). Subsequently, in John
Hacock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 30S U.S. 180 (1939), the Supreme Court held,
in effect, that the farmer had an absolute right to a three-year stay and that there was
no judicial discretion to terminate it earlier, thus eliminating right number 3. Finally,
in Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940), the farmer's right to
redeem his property at the appraisal value was established as being superior to the
mortgagee's right to a public sale. It was further stated that a secured creditor can have
no constitutional claim to more than the appraised value of his security. 311 U.S. 273,
278 (1940). Thus rights numbers 1, 2, and 4 were effectively disposed of, leaving the
mortgagee with the curtailed right to receive rent during the period of the stay. The
conclusion seems inescapable that the alleged constitutional prohibitions of the Radford
case have been sub sileviea overruled. See Note, 35 IL.. L Rav. 878 (1941), for the
suggestion that the creditor has lost by virtue of the Union Central case at least some of
the rights apparently preserved for him by the Vinton Branch case; and Note, 7 Onto
ST. L. J. 433 (1941) for the conclusion that the Union Central case is a silent reversal
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Under the N.B.C. bill the farmer may file an application to redeem all or
any integral part of the property retained in his possession any time within
the three year moratorium period. 13 5 Upon his filing an application to redeem,
both the farmer and the creditor have a right to the reappraisal of the prop-
erty.13 6 Subsequent to the Union Central case decision 37 that the debtor's
right to redeem was superior to the creditor's right to a public sale,13 8 the
sound judicial rule developed that the creditor's right to a reappraisal in turn
took precedence over the debtor's right to purchase at the original appraisal
value. 13 9 By codifying this rule, the N.B.C. bill insures that through reap-
praisal the creditor may take advantage of a rise in value during the morato-
rium while the debtor may profit from any corresponding decline. 140
of the Radford case and an equally silent rejection of the reasoning in the Vinton Branch
case.
Accordingly the N.B.C. bill leaves the mortgagee with none of his Radford case
rights save the greatly restricted right to a share of the excess of rental payments. And
the Lemke bill deprives the mortgagee even of the curtailed right to receive rental dur-
ing the moratorium. But since there is no assurance under either the N.B.C. bill or
Section 75 that the creditor will necessarily receive anything out of the rental, and
since, as has been previously mentioned, the Lemke bill adequately protects the creditor's
security, there would seem to be little doubt that this Lemke bill provision is constitu-
tional.
135. N.B.C. bill § 1006.
136. N.B.C. bill § 1007, quoted in note 140 infra.
137. Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
138. But cf. In re Carter, 56 F.Supp. 385 (W.D.Va. 1944) holding that at the end of
the moratorium the creditor's right to judicial sale is superior to the debtor's right to
redeem. The case is approved in Note, 17 RoCKY MT. L. Rv. 261 (1945), but severely
criticized as not only flying in the face of the Union Central decision but also as ignoring
the policy of §75, in Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 19 J. N. A.
REF. BANKR. 107, 109-10 (1945). 5 CoLIER, BANKRUPTCY 225 n.44 (14th ed. 1946 supp.)
states that the Carter case "appears clearly to be an erroneous decision,"
139. Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 92 (C.C.A. 7th 1942), cert.
de ied 317 U.S. 627 (1942); Haun v. Second Alliance Trust Co., 155 F.2d 618 (C.C.A.
9th 1946) ; In re Rhodes, 59 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.D. 1945) ; In re Schmidt, 54 F.Supp. 262
(D.Neb. 1944); In re Whitwer, 44 F.Supp. 466 (D.Neb. 1942), appeal dislnissed, 133
F.2d 312 (1942) ; In re Kolbe, 43 F.Supp. 803 (N.D.Ohio 1942) ; cf. In re Ulrich, 49
F.Supp. 372 (D.N.D. 1943), appeal dismissed, 139 F.2d 494 (1942); see Worley v.
Wahlquist, 150 F.2d 1007, 1010 (C.C.A. 8th 1945); Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 145
F.2d 816, 818 (C.C.A. 5th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945).
Under §75(s) (3), the debtor also had the right to a reappraisal at the time of re-
demption. 5 COLLIER, BANKRU PcT 225 (14th ed. 1943).
140. "Sec. 1007. The court shall, upon the request of the debtor or of any creditor
affected, order a reappraisal of any property sought to be redeemed by the debtor or
of any integral part or parcel thereof. The reappraisal shall be made, reported and acted
upon in like form and manner and have the like conclusive and binding effect as pro-
vided in this chapter with respect to the original appraisal."
Two alternative methods of reappraisal were provided by §75(s). Moser v. Mortgage
Guarantee Co., 123 F.2d 423 (C.C.A. 9th 1941). But under the terms of §1007 of the
N.B.C. bill, the reappraisal is to be made in the same form and manner as the original
appraisal.
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Like the Lemke bill, the N.B.C. bill clearly contemplates that the farmer
may redeem only part of his property and have the rest released for his credi-
tors.' Such partial redemption was attempted under Section 75 but was met
with the judicial pronouncement that it was not only inequitable but also pos-
sibly unconstitutional.142 Balanced against these arguments, however, is the
consideration that partial redemption would enable a farmer who has over-
expanded during boom years to reduce his farm holdings to a size com-
mensurate with his present financial capacity to redeem and future financial
capacity to operate profitably. Since reappraisal would in fairness have to
take into consideration any increase in value of the property redeemed result-
ing from the partial redemption process, 143 the creditor is to this extent
protected. Furthermore, a court of bankruptcy is invested with equitable
powers'4 and accordingly could be expected to thwart any unconscionable
selection by a farmer of the parts to redeem. This furnishes the creditor an
additional protection. Since it provides a more adequate means of rehabilita-
tion on a sound financial basis, the partial redemption feature of both bills
seems a desirable substantive addition.
In case the debtor fails to redeem all or any integral part of his property at
the end of the moratorium, the N.B.C. bill provides the court with three alter-
native courses of action.140 If the petition was filed in a pending bankruptcy
proceeding, the court shall direct that the previous proceedings be resumed. 40
141. Under § 1006, the debtor may, at any time before the e.\xpiration of the mora-
torium, "file an application to redeem the property, or any integral part or parcel thereof,
retained in his possession". By the terms of § 1010, the trustee is to "administer the un-
redeemed unexempt property retained in possession of a debtor". And § 927 specifies that
in the case of any property not redeemed by the debtor or being administered by his
trustee, the court may, upon application of a creditor holding an encumbrance, vacate
the stay affecting such property. Thus the procedure in case of partial redemption would
appear to be that the unredeemed property would pass to the trustee who would then
release it to the creditors. No provision is made for the bankruptcy court's conducting a
judicial sale of the unredeemed property.
If the debtor is able to pay the rental on all his property, it seems likely that he
would defer any plans of scaling down his holdings until this point Payment of rental
on property that might possibly not be redeemed would seem to be worth the chance that
in some way adequate funds would turn up at the end of the moratorium with which to
redeem all the property.
142. See Paradise Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 140 F. 2d 102, 103
(CC.A. 10th 1944).
143. Section 1007 provides that "the court shall, upon the request of the debtor or of
any creditor affected, order a reappraisal of any property sought to be redeemed by the
debtor or of any integral part or parcel thereof." [Emphasis supplied]. Since reappraisal
would be at the then fair and reasonable market value, and since in fixing such value the
appraisers would naturally have to take into consideration increase in value resulting from
the creation of a more compact and efficient farm, the N.B.C. bill seems to make ample
provision for protecting the creditor at least in respect to valuation.
144. Bankruptcy Act, § 2 (a).
145. N.B.C. bill § 1016.
146. N.B.C. bill §1016(1).
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If the petition was an original petition under this chapter, the court shall
either dismiss the proceedings or direct that regular bankruptcy be proceeded
with, whichever is in the interest of creditors. 147 Modelled on similar provi-
sions in Chapters X through XIII,148 this provision for dismissal or regular
bankruptcy is new to farm bankruptcy legislation. Under 75 (s), if the debtor
failed to redeem, the property was sold at judicial sale and the debtor had
ninety days to redeem at the sale price.149 Furthermore, since the debtor un-
der 75(s) was in all cases entitled to a discharge,lo the N.B.C. bill provision
that the proceedings may be dismissed represents a considerable innovation.
Rearmed with his common law rights following dismissal, the mortgagee
could not only foreclose but also obtain a deficiency judgment. The alterna-
tive provided in the N.B.C. bill of straight bankruptcy, though a second excep-
tion to the rule of Section 4b that a farmer may not be adjudicated an involun-
tary bankrupt, thus seems preferable in that it not only gives the debtor his
discharge but also effects a more equitable distribution among creditors. Upon
payment of the redemption price, the debtor, as under 75 (s), receives title to
the property free of all encumbrances and is discharged of all debts and lia-
bilities except those not dischargeable under Section 17.151
The redemption provisions of the Lemke billla2 vary considerably from
147. N.B.C. bill § 1016 (2).
148. The similar provisions in other chapters of the Bankruptcy act are: §§ 236(1) and
(2) of Chapter X, §§ 376(1) and (2) of Chapter XI, §§ 481 (1) and (2) of Chapter XlI,
and §§ 661 (1) and (2) of Chapter XIII.
149. 5 COLLIER, BANKRurTcy 227-8 (14th ed. 1943).
150. Id. at 228.
151. N.B.C. bill § 1009. Any payments made on principal during the moratorium are
deductible from the redemption price. N.B.C. bill § 1008. See notes 91, 92 supra.
Discharges under § 75(s) were granted subject to § 14. 5 CoLLmR, BAXNRUPTCv 228
(14th ed. 1943). But cf. In re Feil, 46 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Wash. 1942). Nothing is said in
the N.B.C. bill whether compliance with § 14 is a condition precedent to granting a dis-
charge, save that a previous discharge or confirmation of a plan shall be no bar to the
benefits of the chapter. But under the terms of § 902, by which the provisions of Chapters
I to VII are, where not inconsistent, made applicable, it would seem that § 14 would have
to be complied with.
152. Section 941 of the Lemke bill contains the redemption provisions:
"At any time during the three-year period referred to in section, 924, if he
so desires, the farmer-debtor may pay into court the amount of the value estab-
lished as provided in this chapter of any part, parcel, or all of the property of
which he retains possession plus 4 per centum interest on unpaid balances, in-
cluding the amount of encumbrances on his exemptions, up to the amount of
the value established as provided in this chapter, less any amount paid into court
on such values. No further notice or hearings shall be necessary in connection
with that part of the property that the farmer-debtor redeems and pays the
money into court unless the redemption of such part would materially affect
the value of that part of the property not redeemed, but the court shall then,
by an order, turn over possession and title of said property, free and clear of,
encumbrances, to the farmer-debtor. Any farmer-debtor who has filed a petition
under this chapter, and complied with its provisions, whether or not he redeems
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those of the N.B.C. bill. The moratorium period provided by the Lemke bill
may extend two years longer than under either the N.B.C. bill or 75 (s). If
at the end of three years the farmer has paid at least one-half of the appraisal
value of his property into court, the court may extend the moratorium for an
additional period not to exceed two years.1r3 This provision seems eminently
sound. Since the purpose of farm bankruptcy legislation is to maintain the
farmer as owner of his farm and rehabilitate rather than liquidate him, it
would seem only equitable that, if the farmer has indicated his capacity for
rehabilitation by paying one-half of the redemption price during the first three
years, he be given an additional time to reestablish himself.
Like the N.B.C. bill, the Lemke bill provides that the farmer may redeem
only part of his farm and leave the rest to his creditors. 164 In case the farmer
exercises his option of partial redemption at this stage in the proceedings, the
Lemke bill provides that "any payments made by the farmer-debtor on any
such unredeemed property be paid back to him, less depreciation and 4 per
centum interest on the value of such property, as established in this chap-
ter."-lm However, since insurance, taxes, and upkeep have been paid on the
property which the farmer retains for the moratorium but does not redeem
and since the creditor has received interest and will be compensated for de-
predation, his interest in the property is amply protected. Furthermore, as
the creditor will now receive his security, and as the policy of the statute is to
grant the farmer a discharge'and relieve him of a deficiency judgment, there
is no apparent reason why the creditor should be entitled to both payments on
principal and his security to boot.150 Not included in the N.B.C. bill, this
provision seems desirable.
If redemption of only part of the property materially affects the value of
the part not redeemed, further hearings are to be held.1 57 Although ambigu-
ous, this reference to further hearings apparently means a reappraisal. But
except for this reference, the Lemke bill omits any provision for a reap-
praisal. While if land values rose during the moratorium period this would
work to the farmer's advantage, it is equally apparent that if they fell it
would be the mortgagee who profited. In the last analysis, this omission seems
neither equitable nor sound.1 58
any part, parcel, or all of his property, shall, unless such petition is dismissed
under the provisions of this chapter, be accorded his discharge as provided for in
this Act"
153. Lemke bill § 925. In this connection it is worth recalling that the original § 75(s)
provided for a five year moratorium. 48 STAT. 1289 (1934).
154. Lemke bill §§ 924, 926, 932, 937,938, 941.
155. Lemke bill § 926.
156. The same considerations apply to the situation where, at the end of the mora-
torium, the farmer redeems none of his property. As in the case of partial redemption,
there would seem to be no persuasive reason why the creditor should receive not only the
property securing his debt but also payments on principal.
157. Lemke bill § 162.
158. In In re Whitwer, 44 F.Supp. 466 (D.Neb. 1942), Congressman Lemke, on the
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In case the debtor fails to redeem all or any integral part of his property
at the end of the moratorium,5 9 the Lemke bill, like 75(s), provides for the
appointment of a liquidating trustee and a judicial sale following which the
debtor has ninety days to redeem at the sale price.'10 In its phraseology, the
Lemke bill clarifies two previous ambiguities existing at this point in Section
75. By elimination of the phrase "or otherwise disposed of," it is clear that
the liquidating trustee may not abandon the property to secured creditors.10 1
And through the use of more judicious sentence structure, there is no ques-
tion but that the debtor's ninety day redemption period after the sale is ab-
solute 62  The Lemke bill further provides that unless the debtor has re-
quested dismissal he is in all cases entitled to a discharge, subject to the
provisions of Section 14(c).116 Since this eliminates the possibility of a de-
ficiency judgment, it seems preferable to the N.B.C. provision under which
the court has the alternative of dismissing the petition without a discharge.
brief for the debtor, attempted to persuade the court that, under the terms of § 75(s) (3),
if the debtor elected to redeem at the original appraisal valuation there was no authority
for granting a reappraisal. He has apparently incorporated this position, which he at-
tempted unsuccessfully to maintain under § 75, into his new bill. Since the chances of the
farmer's losing are just as great as those of the creditor, it is difficult to see what the
motivating reason for this provision is.
159. See supra note 156.
160. Lemke bill § 926:
"If, however, the farmer-debtor at any time fails to substantially comply with
the provisions of this chapter, or with any lawful order of the court made
pursuant to this chapter, to refinance himself, or redeem all or any part of his
property, at the end of three years, the court may then order the appointment of a
trustee, and order the unredeemed property sold at public auction in accordance
with this Act: Provided, however, That any payments made by the farmer-debtor
on any such unredeemed property be paid back to him, less depreciation and 4 per
centum interest on the value of such property, as established in this chapter. The
debtor shall then have ninety days to redeem any property sold at such sale by
paying the amount for which any such property was sold, together with 4 per
centum per annum interest from date of sale, into court. But, except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, the court shall not dismiss the proceeding without com-
plete liquidation and discharge of the farmer-debtor, unless dismissal of petition is
requested by the farmer-debtor and consented to by a majority in number and
amount of the creditors."
161. It was not clear under § 75 whether, in case of non-redemption, the court might
authorize an abandonment of the property to the secured creditors rather than go through
the formality of a public sale. Compare Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F2d 535
(C.C.A. 10th 1940) with Monjon v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 113 F.2d 535 (C.C.A. 7th
1940). See 5 Cou.ma, BANKRuPTcY 228 (14th ed. 1943).
162. For the position that under § 75 (s) (3) the debtor did not in all circumstances
have the right to redeem for ninety days following the trustee's sale, see Federal Land
Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d 1004 (C.C.A. 10th 1941).
163. The phrase "except as otherwise provided in this chapter" in the last sentence of
§ 926 is ambiguous. Save what is said in the same sentence, there is no provision in the
Lemke bill for dismissal. It would thus seem that one must turn to § 902 by which the
provisions of Chapters I to VII, in so far as not inconsistent or in conflict with the pro-
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Upon payment of the redemption price, the property is turned over to the
farmer free and clear of all encumbrances and he is granted a discharge.Y"
GENERAL PRovisIoNs
The concluding articles of the N.B.C. bill deal with the compensation and
allowances of the referee, trustee, appraisers, and debtor's attorneyl 2C the
priority and distribution of the estate among creditors,lcO the relation of the
proposed chapter to prior creditor's proceedings, 67 the suspension of the
Statute of Limitations during a proceeding under the proposed chapter, GS the
exemption from income tax of any "profit" realized by the debtor as a result
of debt adjustment under the chapter,0 9 and the effective date of the new
chapter if enacted. 1 7 D These provisions are modelled largely on similar sec-
tions in other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act and thus supply tested statutory
provisions to fill the omissions of Section 75.
In the concluding articles of the Lemke bill' 7 ' is one section which attempts
visions of this chapter, are applicable to these proceedings. Since § 902 would make the
provisions of § 14 applicable, it would seem that the grounds specified in § 14(c) would
be those on which dismissal without a discharge could be made. But a previous discharge
in bankruptcy would not be grounds for dismissing the farmer's petition without a dis-
charge. Lemke bill § 981.
Under § 75(s) the farmer was in all cases entitled to a discharge subject to the pro-
visions of § 14. 5 CoLiE., BANKRUPTcY 228 (14th ed. 1943).
164. Lemke bill § 941.
165. N.B.C. bill, Article XII, §§ 1021-1030. The expense of a proceeding under the
N.B.C. bill would be substantially greater than under the Lemke bill. Since it is possible
that no appraisers would be appointed under the Lemke bill, their fees, which must be met
out of the estate under the N.B.C. bill, would be obviated. Since the Lemke bill specifically
provides that no administrative trustee shall be appointed, the trustee's compensation pro-
vided for in the N.B.C. bill has no counterpart in the Lemke bill. The referee under the
N.B.C. bill will usually receive considerably more than the $75 to which the Conciliation
Commissioner is limited under the Lemke bill. The filing fee under the Lemke bill is 25
while under the N.B.C. bill it is $45. Finally, to prevent whittling away of the debtors
estate in litigation with creditors, the Lemke bill provides that "no State or Federal court
shall have power or authority to allow any costs, attorney fees, or expenses incurred by
any creditor after the filing of the petition herein." Lemke bill § 963. Thus the over-all
saving to the debtor's estate under the Lemke bill is considerable.
166. N.B.C. bill, Article XII, §§ 1021-30.
167. N.B.C. bill, Article XIII, §§ 1036-39. This article is substantially similar to
article XIV of Chapter X and Article XII of Chapter XII.
168. N.B.C. bill § 1041. This section is identical with §§ 391, 516, and 676.
169. N.B.C. bill § 1044. This section is identical with § 679 of Chapter XIII.
170. Article XV, embracing sections 1051 through 1055, deals with the effect of the
proposed chapter. Section 1051 is identical with §399(1) of Chapter XI, §526(1) of
Chapter XII, and § 686(1) of Chapter XIIL Section 1052 is similar to § 276(b) of Chap-
ter X and § 526(2) of Chapter XII. Section 1053 deals with changes of accounting prac-
tice in determining fees involved in the transition from Conciliation Commissioner to
Referee. Section 1054 provides for the continued effectiveness of § 75 as to proceedings
commenced under it.
171. Article VIII, embracing sections 961 througlh 964, deals with compensation and
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to lighten the burden of a farmer who has executed a mortgage either on
crops growing, or to be grown in the future.172 The situation of a farmer
with either or both of these mortgages who has filed under the farm bank-
ruptcy provisions is apparent. Normally his only source of income from
which to raise the money to redeem his farm at the end of the moratorium
will be the proceeds from his harvests. On these the mortgagee has a lien
which cannot be reduced below the fair market value of the crops. Since
the fair market value of the crops is what the farmer receives when he sells
them, the mortgagee has a lien upon the entire proceeds. If the mortgage ap-
plies only to crops then in existence, this situation prevails for but one season.
However, if the mortgage covers crops to be grown in the future, the situa-
tion differs considerably. In at least one jurisdiction the lien of a future crop
mortgage is said to attach when the mortgage agreement is made and not
when the crops come into existence so that the lien stands up in bankruptcy.17
Under this theory, the lien on future crops could continue for as long as al-
lowed by state law." 4 Under such circumstances it is thus apparent that if
the crop mortgage were respected the farmer could not even meet his routine
expenses, let alone redeem his property. Accordingly the rights of the holder
allowances, the pertinent provisions of which have been discussed in note 165 supra.
Article IX, embracing sections 971 through 973, covers general provisions. Section
971 states that "the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all judicial or official proceed-
ings in any State or Federal court or under the direction of any State or Federal official,
and shall apply to all creditors, public or private, including any Federal or State corpora-
tion or Federal or State agency." Being later in time, this section, if enacted, would seem
to repeal by implication § 3 (d) of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 50 STAT. 522
(1937), as amended, Pub. L. No. 731, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Tit. I, § 3(d) (Aug. 14, 1946),
7 U.S.C.A. § 1003(d) (Supp. 1946), by which § 75 was made inapplicable to the benefi-
ciaries of the Farm Tenant Act until they had repaid at least 15% of the purchase price.
Section 973 provides that "Any order inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of this
chapter shall be void and shall be reviewable so long as the estate is not liquidated and the
case is still pending." This provision is apparently an attempt to avoid the result of a case
like Union Joint Stock Land Bank v. Byerly, 310 U.S. 1 (1940), where an admittedly
voidable order of the District Court was allowed to stand because a timely appeal was not
taken.
Article X deals with the effect of the new chapter.
172. Lemke bill § 972:
"After the farmer-debtor files his petition under this chapter, the lienholder
on livestock, or poultry, or on annual or perennial crops shall have no lien on the
increase or on the crops produced in the future unless they are embryonically in
existence at the time that the petition is filed. Not less than one-fourth of all
such increase of encumbered livestock or crops grown or growing on encumbered
lands shall be sold when ready for market, and the proceeds be paid into court
and be applied on the value established as provided in this chapter."
173. North Dakota. Thompson Yards Inc. v. Richardson, 51 N.D. 241, 199 N.W. 863
(1924), 19 IuL. L. Rxv. 365 (1925).
174. On the question of whether a present valid mortgage can be executed on future
crops, three views have been adopted. One view, followed in some states, is that such a
mortgage is of no effect. Other states have made such mortgages valid by legislative
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of a crop mortgage in farm bankruptcy proceedings have of necessity been
curtailed in varying degrees by different courts.17
The Lemke bill carries the implications of these decisions to their logical
conclusions. It provides that the holder of a future crop mortgage shall have
no lien on crops or livestock not embryonically in existence at the time the
petition is filed. The mortgagee of crops and livestock in existence at the
time of the filing of the petition is limited to receiving not more than three-
fourths of the proceeds of such crops and livestock. At least one-fourth are
to be paid into court to be applied first to the payment of taxes, insurance,
and upkeep and then to the redemption price. The balance apparently is to
go to the holder of the mortgage. This section seems a logical solution to an
otherwise inescapable dilemma.
CONCLUSION
With a few substantive exceptions, the N.B.C. bill seems far superior to
both the Lemke bill and Section 75. Its arrangement is logical and con-
venient, its phraseology is dear, and its procedure appears complete. The
Lemke bill, on the other hand, is not a polished job of legislative drafting.
Its apparent logical and convenient arrangement is only superficial. In many
places its phraseology is ambiguous. Procedurally incomplete, it would need
a detailed General Order to implement it a 70 However, it includes a number
enactment. But most states in this group have put a statutory limitation on the time
within which the crops must be planted for the mortgage to be operative. In a third group
of states, such mortgages have been sustained by the courts alone on a variety of ra-
tionales. See Comment, 47 Ymxzn L. J. 98, 99-100 (1937) ; Note, 18 NomE D.,= LAw.
62, 62-3 (1942).
175. In regard to a mortgage which is a lien on the entire proceeds of the farmer's
crops already in existence, it has been determined that the mortgagee's lien may validly
be reduced to the extent that payments for harvesting the crop, maintaining the property,
and planting next year's crop may be made out of such proceeds. Adair v. Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350 (1938) ; In re Burke, 51 F.Supp. 552
(S.D. Ga. 1943). The statutory rental payments may be made out of such proceeds. In re
Lange, 48 F.Supp. 753 (S.D. Cal. 1943). But cf. In re Burke, 51 F.Supp. 552 (S.D. Ga.
1943). Both the statutory rental payments and expenses for upkeep and operation may be
made out of the proceeds subject to the lien. In re Borchert, 47 F.Supp. 387 (S.D. Cal.
1942). But for one court's view that nothing more than tax payments could be made out
of the encumbered crop proceeds, see In re Rollins, 46 F.Supp. 977, 978 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
The lien of a mortgagee who, under the North Dakota rule, has a valid lien on future
crops planted after the filing of the farmer's petition, has been respected only to the e.tent
that he receives his share of the excess of rentals Jixed by the court. Reichert v. Federal
Land Bank, 139 F.2d 627 (C.C.A. 8th 1944), cert. denicd 322 U.S. 729 (1944) ; Schafer v.
Federal Land Bank, 142 F2d 1013 (C.C.A. 8th 1944).
176. General Order 50 was necessary to fill in some of the procedural omissions in
§75. Employing the identical phraseology of the last sentence of § 75(b), § 964 of the
Lemke bill authorizes the Supreme Court to make general orders. Section 1045 of the
N.B.C. bill contemplates the issuance of general orders by the Supreme Court but gives
the district courts no discretion to waive them.
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of desirable substantive provisions not embodied in its N.B.C. counterpart.
These provisions are:
(1) The elimination of the two conflicting definitions of "farmer" in
the Bankruptcy Act.
(2) The retention of the position of Conciliation Commissioner.
(3)' The extension of the moratorium period for two additional years
upon the conditions specified.
(4) The provision for the refund of payments on principal made on
property subsequently not redeemed.
(5) The assurance of a discharge, rather than dismissal, except where
the debtor has violated one of the six provisions in Section 14(c)
predicated on personal misconduct.
(6) The curtailment of the mortgagee's rights under a future crop mort-
gage.
Were the N.B.C. bill amended to incorporate these six substantive pro-
visions and a more flexible definition of "farmer", it would be a desirable
permanent addition to the Bankruptcy Act.
